Partisan Friendshoring*

Meghana Ayyagari†, *Janet Gao*‡ and *Pengfei Ma*§

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Abstract

This study examines how U.S. firms reorganize their global supply chains in response to geopolitical tensions and how CEO partisanship influences these decisions. Firms reduce imports from foreign countries with diverging ideologies from the U.S., especially when CEOs are politically aligned with the U.S. administration. Following foreign elections that increase ideological distances from the U.S., aligned CEOs cut imports from these countries by 40% more than misaligned CEOs. Potential mechanisms include aligned CEOs having heightened concerns for geopolitical risk and national security, and demonstrating support for the administration. These politically driven import decisions significantly reduce firm value and performance.

Keywords: Partisanship, Global Supply Chain, Geopolitical Tension, Import

JEL Codes: F14, F51, G30, M12, M14

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†School of Business, George Washington University, Email: ayyagari@gwu.edu

‡McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University, Email: janet.gao@georgetown.edu

§Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University, Email: pengfeima@smu.edu.sg

"[Geopolitical risk] is ratcheting up, ... That's my No. 1 concern, and it dwarves any I've had since I've been working."
– Jamie Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan Chase, 2024

1. Introduction

U.S. firms are increasingly concerned about geopolitical risks in their supply chains. Facing escalating geopolitical tensions and rapidly shifting global alliances, firms must carefully select trade partners to remain competitive and navigate uncertainty.[1] One frequently proposed solution is friendshoring, which advocates businesses to shift their global sourcing toward political allies of the U.S. and away from adversarial nations (Yellen, 2022).[2] While this strategy helps firms temporarily secure dependable supply chain partners, it may become costly if geopolitical allies do not supply the required inputs at competitive prices (Rajan, 2022), or if source countries frequently change their geopolitical positions, making it "problematic" to establish long-term trade partners (James, 2022). Despite the importance of global supply-chain fragility, little micro-evidence exists regarding how firms adjust their global sourcing operations in response to geopolitical risk.

This paper investigates U.S. firms' decisions to import from ideological rivals and allies of the U.S., as well as the heterogeneity of such choices depending on their CEOs' political leanings. In recent years, global trade and foreign policies have triggered intense partisan debates, and partisan alignment with the U.S. administration can potentially shape the views regarding U.S. global alliances and geopolitical tensions.[3] As firm decisions are highly influenced by their leaders' partisan leanings (Engelberg et al., 2022; Colonnelli et al., 2022;

[1] For example, growing strategic competition between the U.S. and China has led to trade restrictions and technology controls (Amiti et al., 2019). Events like the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have disrupted global supply chains and commodity markets with far-reaching economic consequences (WorldBank, 2022; Aizenman et al., 2024).

[2] In 2022, the US Secretary of the Treasury, Janet Yellen emphasized "friendshoring" as an important strategy of the administration's approach to navigating a more contentious global economy, which according to media reports were welcomed by policymakers in Canada and Mexico. Also see "What is Friendshoring," August 30, 2023, *The Economist.*

[3] Recent Pew Research Center surveys reveal sharp partisan divides in how Americans perceive foreign policy and global alliances (Pew Research Center, 2018; Pew Survey, 2024). These divisions have deepened under the Trump administration, as President Trump's warming ties with Putin and criticism of Zelensky have sparked contrasting reactions across party lines (Guardian, 2025).

Rice, 2020; Mkrtchyan et al., 2023; Arikan et al., 2023; Steel, 2024; Fos et al., 2025), it is plausible that CEOs' partisanship can shape firms' responses to geopolitical risks.

We document that U.S. firms reduce import from source countries that become more antagonistic towards the U.S., and this reduction is greater for politically aligned firms than misaligned firms. Such a contrast does not exist in relation to CEOs' party affiliation (i.e., Democrat or Republican), but only appears with regards to firms' political alignment with the U.S. administration. We establish causality using closely won foreign elections that shift a country's relationship with the U.S., coup d'états that can lead to sudden changes in a country's political regimes, and the 2016 U.S. Presidential election that shifted firms' political alignment with the U.S. administration. Delving into the mechanisms, our evidence suggests that heightened geopolitical risk perceptions, concerns for national security, and support for the administration are potential reasons why aligned firms are more responsive to changes in global alliances. Ultimately, friendshoring seems detrimental to firm value, as shown by the incremental value decline of aligned firms when their source countries exhibit diverging ideologies from the U.S.

We leverage several unique datasets to investigate the relationship among firm partisanship, geopolitical tensions, and trade. First, we use transaction-level Bill-of-Lading (BoL) data from the S&P that cover the universe of U.S. maritime imports from 2007–2020, with detailed information on shippers' and importers' names and addresses. We aggregate the trade records to the firm (U.S. importer)-country (foreign)-product-semester (half-year) level. This data allows us to capture both the extensive margin (i.e., whether a firm imports from a country) and the intensive margin (i.e., import volume and number of shipments) of trade decisions. Next, we obtain identities of firm CEOs from Capital IQ People Intelligence, and identify their political affiliations using the voter registration records from L2, a non-partisan data provider used by political groups and academics to identify individuals' political affiliation (e.g. Spenkuch et al., 2023; Engelberg et al., 2022). Finally, we use the United Nations (UN) General Assembly Voting data to identify a country's geopolitical tension from the United States (Voeten, 2013; Bailey et al., 2017).

We start by showing that an increase in the ideological distance between the U.S. and a foreign country is associated with around 11% reduction in an importing firm's shipments from that country. Yet, firms are not more likely to terminate trades from that country. Such average effects mask important heterogeneity across firms. Compared to politically

misaligned firms, firms aligned with the U.S. administration are more likely to cut imports from countries with increasing tensions with the U.S., both in the intensive and extensive margins. A one-standard-deviation increase in the geopolitical tension between a foreign country and the U.S. leads to a 2 percentage points reduction in the likelihood of trade by aligned firms than misaligned firms. Conditional on having imports, aligned CEOs reduce import volume by 14% and the number of shipments by 9% more than misaligned firms, following the same increase in geopolitical tension.

Our analysis includes firm-product-time fixed effects, which allow us to compare imports from different countries by the same firm at the same time. These fixed effects also absorb any effects from time-varying firm conditions, firms' demand for certain products, or changes in expectations or optimism at the firm level. We also include firm-CEO-country-product fixed effects, allowing us to track a firm's imports of a specific product from a particular country over time, under the same CEO's leadership. These fixed effects help address concerns related to the matching between a firm and a source country, between a firm and a product, and changes in operation strategies arising from CEO turnovers. When comparing aligned and misaligned firms, we additionally impose country-product-time fixed effects, which absorb any supply-side dynamics such as a source country's ability or decision to supply certain products as well as time-varying international policies. Our results are also robust to controlling for an industry' political leaning, gauged by the market valuation change around the revelation of the most recent Presidential election outcome. Controlling for country-industry leaning-year fixed effects helps address concerns that our results may capture differential import reliance on a country across industries. In later analysis, we further document that the effect of political alignment on import decisions is driven both by Republican firms under Republican Administration (Trump) and by Democrat firms under Democrat Administrations (e.g., Obama).

Despite the rigorous fixed-effect structure, a remaining concern for our findings is that the tensions between the U.S. and foreign countries can be influenced by their trade relations (Kleinman et al., 2023). We use several identification strategies to address this concern. Our primary strategy relies on close presidential elections in foreign countries as quasi-exogenous shocks to their relationships with the U.S. Using narrowly won elections helps eliminate concerns that election results can be anticipated or predicted by pre-existing economic conditions, policy environments, or other unobserved factors driving both election outcomes and

exports. While close elections do not exist in some of U.S.' most prominent rivals such as China, nor do they usually flip political regimes completely, they represent moderate policy shifts that can lead to uncertainty and disruptions in already complex global supply chains. An election can either increase or decrease the tension between the foreign country and the U.S. We study how firms change imports following tension-increasing relative to tension-decreasing elections, depending on their political alignment with the U.S. administration. We find that, following narrowly won tension-increasing elections, politically aligned firms are 12% more likely to cut imports from the election countries than politically misaligned firms. Importantly, such an effect does not show up in periods prior to the elections, but emerges immediately after the elections.

Moreover, we verify the findings from the foreign-election analysis by studying the effects from coup d'état, which are sudden, forceful seizure of executive authority in a country. Coups, even failed ones, can lead to drastic changes in countries' political regimes and consequently their geopolitical alignment with the U.S. Similar to the evidence above, we find that tension-increasing coups lead to significant incremental reductions in imports by aligned firms compared to misaligned firms.

Our third identification strategy relies on the 2016 U.S. Presidential election as an unanticipated shock to U.S. political regime as well as individual firms' political alignment with the U.S. administration. We find that following the 2016 election, firms headed by Republican CEOs reduce import dramatically from adversarial countries compared with Democrat CEOs. Such effects manifest primarily on the intensive margin (the volume and shipment quantities) rather than the extensive margin (the decision to import or not).

Decisions by CEOs are subject to the oversight of the board of directors. We conjecture that CEOs' partisanship should play a weaker role when a vast majority of the board holds different political beliefs. To test this conjecture, we collect data on the political affiliation of each board member, and gauge to what extent board members share the partisan beliefs of the CEO. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the influence of CEO partisanship on firms global supply chain responses to geopolitical tensions is significantly weaker when the majority of board members are from the opposite political party. This result highlights the importance of political diversity among corporate leaders.

Our results so far suggest that CEOs aligned with the U.S. administration cut imports more from source countries with diverging preferences from the U.S., compared to misaligned

CEOs. How do such politically influenced import decisions affect firm value? In other words, is friendshoring consistent with shareholder value maximization? To answer this question, we examine changes in equity value around foreign elections (i.e., "foreign election cumulative abnormal returns, CARs") and compare the CARs of aligned and misaligned firms that have import exposure to the electing country. For the average affected firm, we find a modest equity return response to both tension-increasing and tension-decreasing foreign elections. However, such responses differ significantly between aligned and misaligned firms, likely because shareholders expect those firms to respond differently to geopolitical tensions. Following a tension-increasing election, aligned firms who source at least 1% of import from the electing country experience a significantly greater decline in equity value by 1.6 percentage points compared to misaligned firms with the same exposure. This magnitude jumps to 2.6 percentage points when we focus on firms with 5% of import exposure from the electing country.

These results suggest that shareholders view politically-motivated friendshoring as value-destroying, either because they disagree with aligned CEOs' risk assessment or because they consider this strategy to be economically suboptimal. Importantly, the incremental drop in equity value by aligned firms relative to misaligned ones is concentrated among firms where the majority of the board members are politically aligned with the CEO, again reflecting the importance of board oversight and political diversity among corporate leaders. To further assess the value implications of friendshoring, we conduct an analysis focusing on firms' operating performance following foreign elections. We find that when their source countries become more antagonistic towards the U.S., aligned firms exhibit significantly worse gross margins than misaligned firms. This result is consistent with the argument that friendshoring may lead to increased input costs.

We explore multiple potential explanations for why aligned firms conduct more friendshoring than misaligned firms: First, aligned firms may consider geopolitical tensions to be more "threatening" to their supply chains and make more drastic changes to their global sourcing operations to avoid such risks. To assess this explanation, we analyze firms' perceived geopolitical risk, measured based on their conference call transcripts (Hassan et al., 2019; Caldara and Iacoviello, 2022). To the extent that cross-firm differences in this measure may reflect differences in persistent firm attributes, we compute within-firm changes in geopolitical risk perceptions between aligned and misaligned firms when their source coun-

tries host elections, either distance-increasing or distance-decreasing. We find that aligned firms express a greater increase in the concerns for geopolitical risk than misaligned firms following elections that led to similar increases in the ideological distances between their source countries to the U.S. This heightened risk perception could explain why aligned firms adjust their supply-chain operations more in response to geopolitical tensions.

Second, it is possible that aligned CEOs are concerned about compromising national security when they import from antagonistic countries. Consistent with this explanation, we find the effects to be significantly stronger for defense firms or defense-related products. Among defense firms, a one-standard-deviation increase in ideological distance is associated with a 16% greater cut in import volume by aligned CEOs than misaligned CEOs.

Third, aligned CEOs might reduce imports from adversarial countries to demonstrate support for the administration's positions — a "follow-the-flag" effect. This idea is consistent with survey-based evidence from Gallup and Pew Research Center, which shows that Republicans exhibit an increased feeling of patriotism under both terms of the Trump presidency, while Democrats expressed stronger patriotism under the Biden presidency. To further test this idea, we use CEO donations to veteran causes as a proxy for patriotic alignment. We find our results to be substantially stronger among CEOs who donate to veteran causes, lending support to the "follow-the-flag" hypothesis.

Fourth, aligned CEOs might adjust their import strategies to protect the economic rents they receive from dealings with the government. We test this explanation by comparing firms with and without a government procurement contract. To the extent that government contracts are valuable purchase agreements, and a good relationship with the U.S. government can help firms obtain or retain government contracts, aligned firms who are also government contractors should be more eager to cut imports from antagonistic countries (e.g., Goldman et al., 2013; Esqueda et al., 2019; Brogaard et al., 2021). However, we find no evidence that government contractors — whether aligned with the administration or not — cut import more from ideologically distant countries than non-contractors. Aligned firms that are also government contractors do not cut imports more from adversarial countries either.

Finally, we assess the concern that our results might be explained by adversarial source countries "discriminating" against aligned CEOs. We first note that several parts of our findings already help alleviate this concern. For example, the moderating effect of anti-partisan boards indicates internal governance mechanisms at work, and the enhanced effects among

patriotic CEOs suggest CEO-driven decisions. We further discuss a specific argument under this concern, i.e., a few large, prominent U.S. firms showing active support for the U.S. government get differential treatment from source countries. We partition our sample by firm size and find our baseline findings to prevail both among both large and small firms. This pattern counters the explanation that suppliers disfavor high-profile, aligned firms.

We subject our findings to a battery of robustness tests. To start, we show that our results are robust to using different measures. This includes (1) measuring import quantities using total shipment weights and the number of containers, (2) measuring geopolitical tension using global conflict events from the GDELT project and political distance that captures differences in political regimes, introduced by Berry et al. (2010), and (3) measuring firm partisan leaning with firms' political campaign contributions. Notably, in a "horse-race" regression including both CEO partisanship and firms' contribution alignment, CEO partisanship continues to generate a significant effect. These findings suggests that CEOs play a unique role in shaping firms' supply-chain choices. They also help mitigate concerns that our results are driven by unobserved firm fundamentals – if such fundamentals were the true drivers, we would expect similar effects from firm-level political donations, which we do not observe.

Next, we show that our baseline results are robust to alternative estimation and sample construction methods. The alternative methods include Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) (Cohn et al., 2022; Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) and the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (Mullahy and Norton, 2024), which can accommodate zeroes in import quantities. Our findings also remain consistent when excluding imports from Canada and Mexico where land-based transportation accounts for a large share of U.S. imports. All our results also remain robust in an annual panel instead of a semester panel.

Finally, our results are also robust to excluding China and Russia, two of U.S.'s primary geopolitical rivals. In other words, our results do not rely on firms holding extreme aversion towards U.S.-China decoupling. This finding, together with the evidence that the partisan friendshoring pattern exists consistently under Obama and Trump administrations, allays the concern that our effect is driven by the rerouting of China-U.S. through other countries.[4]

This research contributes to the growing literature at the intersection of Political Econ-

[4]Despite prevalent concern that Chinese firms re-route their U.S. exports through third countries like Vietnam (e.g. Javorcik et al., 2025), recent research (e.g. Iyoha et al., 2024) shows that only a small fraction of trade (ranging from 1.4% at the firm level and 3.6% at the country level) is actually rerouted from China to countries like Vietnam.

omy and Finance. Recent work documents the impact of political polarization on economic decisions by households, firms, financial intermediaries, and regulators (Cookson et al., 2020; Gormley et al., 2021; Duchin et al., 2021; Dahl et al., 2022; Engelberg et al., 2022; Meeuwis et al., 2022; Kempf et al., 2023; Colonnelli et al., 2022). In the context of corporate decision-making, recent studies show that firm managers' partisanship affects investment and hiring decisions (Rice, 2020; Gift and Gift, 2015; Colonnelli et al., 2022), and there is a strong sorting effect even at the executive level (Fos et al., 2025). Multiple contemporaneous studies document that the matching of customers and suppliers, both domestically and internationally, is shaped by the similarity in firms' political ideologies (e.g., Gupta and Homroy 2024; Charoenwong et al. 2024; Chena et al. 2024; Kempf et al. 2025). Our paper complements this literature by focusing on firms' responses to geopolitical tensions and documenting that such responses are shaped by the political alignment of corporate leaders with the U.S. administration. Instead of discussing CEOs' ideological preferences for the ruling party in foreign countries (Charoenwong et al., 2024; Kempf et al., 2025), we highlight domestic partisan channels through which CEOs internalize U.S. administrations' geopolitical objectives and perceptions. These approaches illuminate different facets of how political ideology shapes the global supply chain network.

Our results also expand the literature on how geopolitical ties affect trade and capital flows between countries. Studies have shown that political alignment between countries influences bilateral trade flows (Pollins, 1989a,b; Mityakov et al., 2013; Li et al., 2021; Qiu et al., 2024), foreign direct investment (Aiyar et al., 2024; Kempf et al., 2023), pricing of foreign equities and sovereign borrowing (e.g., Ambrocio et al., 2024; Ambrocio and Hasan, 2021), cross-border mergers and acquisitions activity (e.g., Aleksanyan et al., 2021), and macro trade and investment patterns (e.g., Gupta and Yu, 2007; Rose, 2007; Nitsch, 2007). Several recent papers have focused on specific geopolitical conflicts, such as the U.S.-China trade war and the sanctions to Russia, examining their impact on trade patterns (e.g., Handley et al., 2020; Corsetti et al., 2024; Li et al., 2024). Others have explored the role of other types of international relations in increasing trade frictions including cultural biases (Guiso et al., 2009); military hostility (e.g., Glick and Taylor, 2010; Martin et al., 2008); worsening consumer attitudes due to deteriorating relations (Michaels and Zhi, 2010); and ethnic differences (Aker et al., 2014). Our research makes a distinct contribution by documenting how geopolitical ties differentially affect firms based on their partisan alignment.

Previous research has examined how trade patterns of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are more affected by political conflicts than other types of firms (e.g., Fisman et al., 2014; Du et al., 2017; Davis et al., 2019). These studies suggest that governments have greater influence in aligning the behavior of state-owned firms with state interests. Our work furthers this line of research by examining firm-level decisions. In particular, we show how private sector firms' trade decisions can be influenced by the political alignment of their leadership with the current administration and explore the underlying mechanisms driving this relationship.

2. Data and Sample Construction

2.1. Bill of lading (BoL) Data

Firm import data comes from S&P Panjiva, which collects the BoL data from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The data consist of transaction-level records of maritime trade across countries from 2007 (the first year data is available) to 2020. For each transaction, Panjiva provides the shipment origin location (country), arrival date, consignee information (name and address), product description including the Harmonized System (HS) product codes, and quantity (including twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs), weights, and containers).[5] The BoL data has been used extensively by academics (e.g., Ganapati et al., 2021; Ayyagari et al., 2024) and described in detail in Flaaen et al. (2023).

2.1.1. Identifying Public Firms and Initial Sample Construction

We link U.S. importers in Panjiva to publicly listed firms' identifiers (Compustat GVKEY) by combining several crosswalks. To start, we use the bridge provided by Panjiva that links importers to their associated company identifiers in S&P Capital IQ, which is available for only 10% – 15% of U.S. consignees. To expand this linkage, we match Panjiva importer names with establishment names in National Establishment Time-Series (NETS), and trace the parent company information based on the parent-subsidiary relationships provided by NETS. We then use the S&P Global Market Intelligence Business Entity Cross Reference

[5]Maritime trade is the most important transport mode for the U.S., accounting for nearly 50% of import value. However, trade with Mexico and Canada is conducted almost entirely via land. We address this concern in Section 7.5 by showing that our results are robust when we exclude Mexico and Canada.

Service (BECRS) to link the parent company identifiers with Capital IQs' company identifiers. Finally, we match companies' identifiers in S&P Capital IQ to Compustat identifiers (gvkey). Appendix IA.2.1 provides a detailed description of this multi-step process.

We follow Smirnyagin and Tsyvinski (2022) and Bisetti et al. (2023) in constructing a sample that tracks firms' importing activity. We start with the universe of shipments imported by U.S. consignees, which is characterized by the importer name, the product (2-digit HS code), the origin country, and time. We drop observations with missing firm identifiers, match consignees to Compustat *GVKEY* as described above, and apply the following sample filters: (1) We drop firms making transactions less than 50% of the observations (country-product-time). This helps us focus on active importers. In Table IA.1, we show that our results are not dependent on this filter. (2) We follow Smirnyagin and Tsyvinski (2022) and drop firms with big spikes in import volumes, where spikes are defined as variations exceeding three times the sample standard deviation.[6] (3) We drop logistics companies and firms in the transportation industry (SIC first digit = 4).[7] (4) We drop companies from the finance industry (SIC first digit = 6).

After these sample filters, we aggregate the remaining shipments into a firm-product-source country-semester (half-year) panel. Using a semi-annual frequency allows us to capture more granular changes in firm import decisions within a year.

We measure the quantity of firms' import of each product from a given source country in several ways. Our main measures include the number of shipments (*Shipments*) and the total volume (*Volume*) of imports. A shipment is the cargo, regardless of size, recorded in a single bill of lading. It is reflected as one line of record in Panjiva. Volume is measured by the number of Twenty-Foot Equivalent Unit (TEU), which is a unit of measurement for a ship's capacity. Note that the BoL records are based on shipments, and therefore an individual record (and hence unit of quantity) could be comprised of more than one (and often many) individual products. We equally allocate import volume for them when calculating the TEU volume, weight, and number of containers for each product. When calculating *Shipments*,

[6]This is because some firms may request that the U.S. Customs and Border Protection remove their identity in the shipper or consignee field. The request is fulfilled for two years before requiring renewal. As a result, import data for companies that request redactions may show spikes.

[7]Logistics companies are identified by the list of the largest logistic firms in the U.S., complied by Armstrong & Associates, Inc., a leading third-party logistics market research company. We also drop companies where the importer's name contains the words "logistic", "distribution", or "freight."

we count it as one shipment for each product. In some cases, the TEU values can be missing when shipments are not containerized, such as oil imports.

We decompose the variation in import quantities into the extensive margin and the intensive margin. At the extensive margin, we define *Have Import* as an indicator variable that equals one if a firm imports the product from a country in that semester, and zero otherwise. At the intensive margin, we look at *Log(Volume)* and *Log(Shipments)*, which only take non-missing values when a firm has decided to import a product from a foreign country.

In robustness checks, we apply Poisson regressions and Inverse Hyperbolic Transformation to estimate the overall changes in import volume and shipment. We also use alternate measures including *Containers*, the total number of shipment containers; and *Weight*, the total shipment weight (in kilograms).

2.2. Identifying Political Partisanship of CEOs

We obtain the identities of firms' CEO and board members from Capital IQ People Intelligence. Specifically, we extract their name, date of birth, and gender, which will be used to match with voter records to obtain political affiliation. The Capital IQ People Intelligence has a much larger coverage compared to other databases with information on CEOs such as Execucomp, which only covers S&P 1500 firms.[8]

Information on U.S. voters comes from L2, Inc, which collects data from a number of sources including local election boards, exit polling, and commercial lifestyle data. This data is commonly used by researchers to identify an individual's party affiliation (Engelberg et al., 2022; Bernstein et al., 2022; Spenkuch et al., 2023; Fos et al., 2025). We look up CEOs in the L2 data based on name, date of birth, gender, and the distance between the address of the firm and the resident address or mailing address. Among the firm-years in our sample, 66.8% of the CEOs can be matched with L2 data. We identify CEOs' political leaning using their voting history in national primary elections. If a CEO voted in the Republican (Democrat) party primaries, we consider this individual to be Republican (Democrat). We drop CEOs with missing affiliations or associated with more than one party and construct a

[8]Figure IA.1 compares the data coverage of Compustat U.S. firms' CEOs by Capital IQ People Intelligence and Execucomp. On average, firms that are covered by Execucomp but not by Capital IQ People Intelligence only account for 7% of the combined sample. However, more than 70% of firms are covered by Capital IQ People Intelligence but not by Execucomp.

non-time-variant party affiliation measure.[9] Our main variable of interest is *Aligned CEO*, a dummy variable that is equal to one if the CEOs party affiliation is the same as the current U.S. President and zero otherwise.

The prior literature has measured CEOs' political leaning based on their voter registration records and contribution to political campaign candidates. There are pros and cons of each measure. Voters' registration may not be updated frequently and individuals that have registered in previous years may not show up to vote. In some states, registration with one party does not prevent individuals from voting in another party's primary elections. In our data, this case is highly uncommon. 93.4% (94.6%) of CEOs registered with the Democratic (Republican) Party vote in only Democrat (Republican) elections. In additional analyses, we show that our results carry through if we identify CEOs' partisanship using voter registration records.

CEO contributions, however, may represent their investment in political connections, rather than their personal beliefs. 79.3% (90.3%) CEOs voted in the Democratic (Republican) party primaries make more contributions to Democratic (Republican) candidates.

For robustness, we also measure firm partisanship based on campaign contributions. We define *Aligned Firm (Contribution)*, an indicator that turns to one if over 50% of a firm's political campaign contribution goes to the candidates affiliated with the President's party, and zero otherwise. We consider this an auxiliary measure but not the main measure because firms often contribute to both sides of the political spectrum (Cooper et al., 2010).

Finally, we gauge the partisan leaning of a firm's board of directors by looking up each board member in the L2 database following the same procedure as the one for CEOs. We then calculate the percentage of board members that are affiliated with the CEO's party to gauge board-CEO alignment. In computing this measure, we only include Democrat and Republican board members, since it is unclear whether board members affiliated with "Other Party" are aligned or misaligned with CEOs of "Other Party."

[9] 12% of our sample CEOs are observed to have voted in more than one party. Consistent with our statistics, Fos et al. (2025) document that 12% of registered voters in Illinois switch between Democrat and Republican parties between 1976 and 2017.

2.3. Geopolitical Tension Based on UN General Assembly Voting

We gauge the geopolitical tension between the U.S. and a foreign country using the "distance" between state preferences introduced by Voeten (2013) and Bailey et al. (2017). This measure is computed based on countries' voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) using the Ideal Points Distance (IPD) approach, which is commonly used in the political science literature (e.g., Gartzke, 1998; Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Dreher and Jensen, 2007). The measure gauges divergence in state preferences, and reflects geopolitical tensions between countries more than ideological dissonance, but also strategic alliances and rivalry between countries, and the aggressiveness of foreign policies. We provide a brief explanation of the Ideal Points Distance (IPD) approach below. A more detailed description is provided by Bailey et al. (2017).

For each resolution in the UNGA, member countries have three voting options: Yes (in favor), No (against), or Abstain.[10] The Ideal Points Distance (IPD) approach uses countries' voting records as inputs and constructs a time-varying measure of ideal points based on a Bayesian model. In this model, each country's vote on a resolution is a probabilistic outcome influenced by (1) the country's policy preferences, or "ideal point" (θ) and (2) the resolution's characteristics, such as how polarizing it is along the policy spectrum. Based on countries' actual votes, the algorithm uncovers the hidden parameters, including θ using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulations. Each country is thus assigned an ideal point (θ) on an ideological spectrum based on how they vote in each UNGA session and we take the average of the estimated values of the ideal point for each country across all sessions within a year.[11]

The geopolitical tension between a foreign country and the U.S. can be measured as the distance between their ideal points, or the absolute value of the difference between their ideal points:

[10] Absences are recorded differently from an abstention and rather than reflecting a country's view, absences are typically due to a temporary lack of government due to civil war or coups or other conflicts (Voeten, 2013).

[11] The ideal point can take negative and positive values, whereby positive sign of the ideal point indicates alignment with the West, particularly the U.S. and its allies. While the exact numerical value can vary slightly across different years, the U.S. typically has the most positive ideal point in the dataset, meaning it is at the far-right end of the ideological spectrum. Other Western-aligned countries (e.g., Canada, the UK, and Australia) usually have positive ideal points as well, but not as extreme as the U.S. Countries that frequently oppose U.S. positions (e.g., Russia, China, Iran) tend to have strongly negative ideal points. Countries with ideal points near zero are more centrist or exhibit mixed voting behavior, depending on the issue.

$$Distance_{US-j} = |\theta_{US} - \theta j|, \tag{1}$$

where θ_{US} and θ_j are the ideal points of the U.S. and the foreign country respectively. A smaller distance indicates similar policy preferences, while a larger distance suggests divergent preferences.

Compared to just counting voting coincidence, this approach provides a more nuanced measure of country positions, separating real preference changes from changes in what is being voted on. For example, it accounts for the varying importance of different resolutions and their polarizing nature and allows for a dynamic representation of country preferences over time. Several studies (e.g., Voeten, 2013; Bailey et al., 2017; Häge and Hug, 2016) show that IPD does not conflate shifts in the global agenda or topics discussed at the UN with genuine shifts in geopolitical preferences between countries. Interestingly, even countries commonly believed to be U.S. allies such as France and Italy exhibit substantial time-series variation in their alignment with the U.S. (Bailey et al., 2017).

Merging firms' import records, CEO political affiliations, and source countries' ideological distance with the U.S. leaves us with a firm-country-product-semester panel, which includes 708 firms and 885 unique CEOs that import from 96 countries across 93 unique products. The sample contains 110,644 observations, spanning from 2007 to 2020.

2.4. Other Data on Geopolitics

We collect foreign election data from the Manifesto Project Database (MPD). The MPD collects election date and votes for each party. Combining with the source countries in our import sample, we are able to obtain election information from 47 source countries.

In addition to foreign elections, we also exploit data on coups from *Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) Coup d'État Events, 1946–2021* database (Marshall and Marshall, 2022).[12] This dataset provides comprehensive coverage of all coup d'état in countries with populations exceeding 500,000 since 1946, distinguishing between successful, attempted (failed), plotted, and alleged coup plots. A coup is defined as a forceful seizure of executive authority

[12]The CSP datasets, including the Coup d'tat Events database, are widely used in the political science and economics literature on regime instability, democratization, and the economic consequences of political violence (e.g., (Marinov and Goemans, 2014; Goldstone et al., 2010)).

by members of a country's political or military elite that results in a substantial change in executive leadership and regime policy, but not necessarily in the form of government. The data exclude social revolutions, foreign invasions, popular uprisings, and voluntary or constitutional transfers of power. We use these coup events as quasi-exogenous shocks to political instability that can abruptly alter a country's geopolitical alignment and its relations with the United States. Incorporating coups extends our identification strategy beyond electoral turnover to include larger, less predictable disruptions to political order.

We complement the existing measure of geopolitical tensions between U.S. and foreign countries using data from the GDELT project (Leetaru and Schrodt, 2013; Gleditsch et al., 2014; Davis et al., 2019; Li et al., 2021). GDELT compiles over 200 million global events reported across 75 international news sources since 1979. It employs the Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO) coding scheme, assigning each event a Goldstein score from -10 to 10, which refelcts the theoretical impact of the event on a country's stability. Negative values indicate conflict events. We follow Li et al. (2021) and sample on "government" events, i.e., events initiated by the government of one country toward another country. Events related to trade, business, and economics are dropped to avoid endogeneity.[13] From the sample CAMEO events, we compute the percentage of events between the U.S. and a source country that have negative Goldstein scores (*%Conflict Event*).

Berry et al. (2010) develop an institutional approach to measuring cross-nation differences across multiple dimensions, whereby differences are measured by dyadic distances using the Mahalanobis method. We use political distance as an alternative measure of geopolitical tension, which takes into account the differences in political stability, democracy, and trade bloc membership. In Section 7, we show the robustness of our results to controlling for other well-populated distance measures, including economic, administrative, demographic, and geographical distances.

[13]Specifically, we drop events that fall into the following categories: Demand economic cooperation; Demand economic aid; Demand easing of economic sanctions, boycott, or embargo; Reject economic cooperation; Reject request for economic aid; Refuse to ease economic sanctions, boycott, or embargo; Reject plan, agreement to settle dispute; Threaten to boycott, embargo, or sanction; Reduce or stop economic assistance; Impose embargo, boycott, or sanctions.

3. Descriptive Patterns

3.1. Summary Statistics

Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the main variables used in our study, including firms' import decisions and quantities, as well as CEO political ideology. In our sample, the average firm imports a product from a source country 73.7% of the time. The average import for a firm-country-product pair has a volume of 36.25 TEUs and 9.81 shipments during a semester. The majority of CEOs in our sample are Republicans (69.3%) and only around 26.4% are Democrats with the rest being affiliated with other parties. In 45.4% of the observations, *Aligned CEO* equals one, representing a firm having a CEO affiliated with the same party as the U.S. President. The ideological distance between the U.S. and other countries is 2.65, ranging from 0.11 (U.S. and Israel in 2020) to 4.62 (U.S. and Zimbabwe in 2017).

Table 1 About Here

3.2. Geopolitical Tension and Import Decisions

Figure 1 illustrates the temporal variation in firm import patterns, measured both in levels of shipping volume and number of shipments. These metrics show significant fluctuations over time, including a substantial recovery in late 2012 following the great trade collapse of 2008-09, a pattern documented in numerous studies, including Ahn et al. (2011), Levchenko et al. (2010), and Baldwin (2009). The subsequent decline in the later part of the decade has been similarly noted in recent research by Flaaen et al. (2023), who also demonstrate that Panjiva's bill of lading data closely tracks Census Bureau statistics on containerized vessel imports. Moreover, they find that these BoL aggregates correlate strongly with total U.S. goods import value, despite the latter including non-maritime trade, suggesting that the BoL data effectively captures broad patterns in U.S. trade dynamics.

Figure 1 About Here

Panels B and C of Figure 1 present the top 10 industries and products represented in our sample. The most common industries are manufacturers, including industrial machinery, computer equipment, and electronics, followed by chemical products and measurement tools.

The most commonly imported products include machinery and electronics, base metals, and plastics and rubber.

We note that firms actively change their import decisions within a year. In Figure IA.2, we plot the percentage of firms in our sample making significant changes in import decisions at the semester level. We find that around 2–4% of firms start importing from at least one new source country from which they had not imported during the previous year ("Add"), around 15–30% of firms stop importing from at least one country from which they had imports in the previous year ("Drop"), and around 1–3% of firms do both ("Add and Drop"). This pattern seems broadly consistent with the evidence in the literature and suggests that U.S. public firms frequently switch the sources of imports, and there is rich within-year variation in such decisions.[14]

Figure 2 plots in binscatter format the association between the aggregate import quantities by our sample firms from a foreign country and the geopolitical tension between the U.S. and that foreign country. The top (bottom) row of figures reports the correlation for import volume (shipments) and distance. Within each row, we first present this relationship for all U.S. firms in our sample (Panels A and D) and then separately for aligned firms (Panels B and E) and misaligned firms (Panels C and F). There is a clear, negative association between import quantity and ideological distance at the aggregate level. This negative relationship is considerably stronger for aligned firms than for misaligned firms.

FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

We next analyze the relationship between geopolitical tension and firm imports using the following specification:

$$Import_{ipct} = \beta_1 Distance_{ct} + \phi_{ipt} + \gamma_{icp} + \epsilon_{ipct} \tag{2}$$

where $Import_{ipct}$ is the import of product p by firm i from country c during time t (in semesters), and it is one of the following variables: *Have Import*, *Log(Volume)*, or *Log(Shipments)*; and $Distance_{ct}$ is the time-varying geopolitical tension between the U.S. and the foreign

[14]Using a hand-collected sample, Pankratz and Schiller (2024) document that more than 60% of supply-chain contracts can be canceled for convenience with an average termination notice of about 120 days. Using a sample of proprietary contracts of a large transportation company and its suppliers, Iyer and Sautner (2018) calculate an average contract term of 5.34 years, the observed switching time is 0.84 years.

country (c). This analysis includes various fixed effects, including firm × product × time fixed effect (ϕ_{ipt}) and firm × CEO × country × product fixed effects (γ_{icp}). Standard errors are double clustered at the country and firm level.

Table 2 reports the results. Panel A reports the extensive margin (*Have Import*) and intensive margin effects (*Log(Volume)*, and *Log(Shipments)*). Panel B reports the overall import responses based on Poisson and IHT methods. We do not observe a significant effect on the extensive margin, but some negative impacts of geopolitical tension on the intensive margin of import quantities. A one-standard-deviation increase in ideological distance is associated with a 11% reduction in import volume and 10% reduction in the number of shipments for the average firm, although the effect on import volume is not statistically significant at conventional levels.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

3.3. CEO Partisanship and Import Decisions

We explore through several avenues whether the political ideology of the CEO alone affects firms' import decisions, independent of geopolitical tensions. First, we examine whether firms with aligned and misaligned CEOs have different tendencies to import from foreign countries. Next, we examine whether firms with Democrat or Republican CEOs import more or less compared to firms with CEOs affiliated with neither party. Finally, we partition observations by both the party affiliation of CEOs and the party of the U.S. President. Results are reported in Table IA.2.

In some specifications, we see that firms headed by Democrat CEOs import more on average compared to firms with non-Democrat and non-Republican CEOs, irrespective of the party of the U.S. administration. However, this effect is not consistently statistically significant. There is also no significant difference between the import likelihood or quantity between aligned and misaligned CEOs. We do not find firms headed by aligned and misaligned CEOs to have different import volumes either.

4. Main Results

4.1. Politically Alignment and Friendshoring

In this section we investigate whether politically aligned CEOs are more likely to restrict trade from countries that become adversarial to the U.S., compared to misaligned CEOs. We estimate the following specification:

$$Import_{ipct} = \beta_1 Distance_{ct} + \beta_2 AlignedCEO_{it} \times Distance_{ct} + \phi_{ipt} + \gamma_{icp} + \tau_{cpt} + \epsilon_{ipct} \quad (3)$$

where $Import_{ipct}$ and $Distance_{ct}$ are defined as in Equation (2). We continue to control for firm × product × time fixed effect (ϕ_{ipt}) and firm × CEO × country × product fixed effects (γ_{icp}), and further layer on country × product × time fixed effects (τ_{cpt}).

The coefficient of interest is β_2, which captures the incremental effect of CEO political ideology on the sensitivity of import decisions to changes in the ideological distance from the source country to the U.S. The main effect of *Aligned CEO* is absorbed by firm × product × time fixed effects. Standard errors are double clustered by source country and firm.

Results are reported in Table 3. Panel A presents the differential effect of geopolitical tension on aligned and misaligned firms' import decisions both on the extensive (*Have Import*) and intensive margin (*Log(Volume)* and *Log(Shipments)*). We add controls and fixed effects in stages. In column (1), we include firm × product × time fixed effects, whereby time is measured by semesters (half-years). This set of fixed effects helps control for time-varying firm demand for a product. We also include firm × CEO × country fixed effects to eliminate time-invariant factors affecting firms import of a product from a country as well as changes associated with CEO turnover within a firm. In column (2), we add firm × CEO × country × product fixed effects, which allow us to track within-firm-product-country variation over time. In column (3), we add further country × product × time fixed effects to remove confounding dynamics at the country-product level, such as tariffs levied on the product from the country and the country's ability to supply product during time t.

Table 3 About Here

Across all measures of import decisions and regression specifications, we document a neg-

ative and statistically significant coefficient for *Distance* × *Aligned CEO*. The economic effects are sizable. The estimates in column (3) suggest that a one-standard-deviation increase in the geopolitical tension between a foreign country and the U.S. leads to a 2 percentage points incremental decline in the import likelihood by a firm with an aligned CEO from that country, compared to a firm with a misaligned CEO. This accounts for about a 5% reduction relative to the standard deviation of the dependent variable.[15]

Results from the intensive margin (columns (6) and (9)) suggest that a one-standard-deviation increase in ideological distance is associated with around a 13% greater reduction in import volume and a 7% greater reduction in import shipments.[16]

Given that *Volume* and *Shipments* follow skewed distributions, we repeat our baseline analysis using a Poisson regression approach and Inverse Hyperbolic Transformation (Cohn et al., 2022). Results in Panel B report similar effects from these alternative estimation methods as the OLS estimates.

In Table 4, we repeat the same specification as outlined in Equation (3), while replacing CEO alignment using the CEO party affiliation itself. The coefficients of interest are the interaction terms *Rep CEO*×*Distance* and *Dem CEO*×*Distance*, where *Rep CEO* and *Dem CEO* are indicators for whether a CEO is registered with the Republican party and the Democratic party, respectively. The absorbed baseline interaction term is CEOs registered with other parties. We do not find any effect from CEOs' party affiliation itself. This indicates that our results are not driven by whether CEOs of either party hold conservative beliefs, but rather by their political alignment with the U.S. administration.

Table 4 About Here

Could our baseline results be driven by the drastic changes in U.S. international relations

[15]The economic effects on the extensive margin are very consistent with Mityakov et al. (2013), who also examine UN voting-based ideological distance and find an estimated impact of 2 percentage points on trade likelihood. Moreover, when including fixed effects, Mityakov et al. (2013) report a 60% increase in the magnitude of the effect, suggesting that unobserved firm-level factors may amplify the impact of political misalignment. In the broader literature, our extensive margin results align with studies on political conflicts and trade disruptions (e.g., Heilmann, 2016; Fuchs and Klann, 2013).

[16]The intensive margin economic effects are in line with findings from Mityakov et al. (2013) who estimate that a 1 standard deviation increase in ideological distance (0.18) leads to a trade decline of around 20%. They report that the effect is much stronger in sector-specific cases, with a 70% decline for petroleum imports, suggesting that politically sensitive industries may experience greater disruptions. Heilmann (2016) also reports trade disruptions of 2% to 18% due to consumer-driven political actions.

and trade policies in recent years? We decompose the CEO alignment into Democratic CEOs under Democratic President (the Obama administration) and Republican CEOs under Republican President (mostly the Trump administration) and re-run the analysis.[17]

Table IA.3 reports the results. Across various specifications, there is no clear evidence suggesting whether Democrat or Republican CEO-Presidents matter more in reducing imports with increasing ideological distance from the foreign country. Notably, the effect of CEO alignment is consistently robust. This finding highlights that our baseline effects are not purely driven by the drastic changes in foreign policy and trade attitude under the Trump administration.

4.2. Identification Strategies

Our baseline analysis imposes high-dimensional fixed effects to address numerous confounding factors, such as the choice of products to import by a firm, the time-invariant characteristics of a firm-source country pair, and firms' time-varying conditions, including the overall demand for imported goods. However, a remaining concern with our findings is that a foreign country's alignment with U.S. votes in U.N. meetings may depend on the trade relations between them, which, in turn, can be influenced by the import decisions of major U.S. companies.

We address this concern in three ways. Our primarily identification strategy utilizes close foreign elections as quasi-exogenous shocks to foreign countries' political ideology (Kempf et al., 2023). Second, we utilize the 2016 U.S. Presidential election as a surprising change in U.S. global alliances. Third, we exploit coups in source countries as shocks to the political reigme in those countries.

4.2.1. Close Foreign Elections

We examine how U.S. firms' import decisions change after elections that occur in the source countries. The rationale behind this analysis is that foreign elections lead to sharp changes

[17] In our data, CEOs can be affiliated with the Democrat party (*Dem CEO*), the Republican party (*Rep CEO*), or other parties (*Other CEO*). There are two types of administrations, indicated by *Dem President* and *Rep President*. We interact the CEO indicators with the president indicators, leading to six combination scenarios, and interact each of the six scenarios with *Distance*. We then regress firms' import decisions on all six interaction terms. Given that these six scenarios include all possible realizations, the standalone term *Distance* drops out of the regression.

in countries' political regime, which in turn can alter their relationship with the U.S. government.

Our event study focuses on close elections, whose outcomes are least likely to be anticipated. We define close elections as those whose winning margins fall in the bottom quartile across all foreign elections in our sample, where the cutoff is a winning margin of 4%. While close elections do not occur in major rival countries such as China, nor do they normally represent drastic political regime changes, they can capture moderate political shifts that lead to abrupt changes in regulations or trade policy. Particularly in environments characterized by coalition governments or fragmented political outcomes, foreign policy reversals and shifts in international commitments highlight geopolitical uncertainty. The close election sample includes 22 countries.

We construct a $[-4, +4]$-semester event window around each close foreign election. To get a clean event window for an election in a country, we require there to be no other elections from that country, no party-switching U.S. election during the time window, and no switching of CEOs for the firm. This ensures that the foreign election only affects the ideological distance between the U.S. and the foreign country, but does not switch the alignment between a firm and the U.S. President.

Following the election, a foreign country may have moved closer to or farther away from the U.S., or remain unchanged in terms of political alignment. To distinguish distance-increasing and distance-decreasing elections, we calculate the average ideological distance between the foreign country and the U.S. during the pre- and post-event windows, and take the difference between the two ($\Delta Distance$). We also define an indicator $Distance\ Inc$, which equals one when a foreign election increases the ideological distance between the U.S. and that country during the event window.

For each election event, we form an event-specific sample by gathering all firm-product pairs where the firm imported that product at least once from the foreign country during the event window. We also only keep firms with Democrat and Republican CEOs to simplify the event study. We then stack together the event samples across all election events, forming a stacked event sample. This sample helps address concerns related to differential treatment timing in the generalized difference-in-difference framework.

We examine the differential response of aligned and misaligned CEOs to exogenous shocks

to ideological distances by estimating the following triple-difference model:

$$Import_{eipct} = \beta Aligned\, CEO_{it} \times Distance\ Change_{ect} \times Post_{e,t} + \delta Aligned\, CEO_{it} \times Post_{e,t} + \gamma_{iep} + \tau_{ept} + \epsilon_{ipct}, \quad (4)$$

where *Post* indicates semesters after an election. *Distance Change* can take the form of continuous changes in distance, i.e., $\Delta Distance$, or the binary variable, *Distance Inc*, which turns to one if a close election increases the ideological distance between a foreign country and the U.S. Our estimation includes rigorous fixed effects: firm-election-product (γ_{iep}) fixed effects and election-product-time (τ_{ept}) fixed effects.[18]

Columns (1) and (3) of Table 5 report the results with the $\Delta Distance$ measure. Consistent with the implication from the baseline analysis, we find negative coefficients for β, although the effect is statistically significant only along the intensive margin. This finding suggests that politically aligned CEOs reduce imports more than misaligned CEOs from countries that become equally more adversarial towards the U.S. Columns (2) and (4) present similar results from the *Distance Inc* measure. The estimates suggest that aligned CEOs are 12.4% more likely to cut import and reduce import volume (shipments) by around 45% (42%) more than misaligned CEOs from a country that experienced a distance-increasing election, compared to those experiencing distance-decreasing elections.

TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

Next, we investigate the dynamic effect of close foreign elections on the import decisions of politically aligned and misaligned firms. Specifically, we estimate the following model:

$$Import_{eipct} = \sum_{k=-4}^{4} \beta_k Aligned\ CEO_{it} \times Distance\ Change_{ect} \times 1_{t=t_e+k} + \sum_{k=-4}^{4} \delta_k Aligned\ CEO_{it} \times 1_{t=t_e+k} + \gamma_{iep} + \tau_{ept} + \epsilon_{ipct}, \quad (5)$$

[18] We do not include firm-product-time interactive fixed effects because in the intensive margin analysis, this set of fixed effects impose the restrictive requirements that firms need to be consistently importing the same product simultaneously from countries with distance-increasing and distance-decreasing elections around those events. Adding them generates negative R^2 values.

where k indicates semesters in an event-window, e indicates a close election, and t_e indicates the semester of the close election. Parameter $1_{t=t_e+k}$ is an indicator that equals one if the current semester t is semester k following the election semester. The triple interaction coefficients β_k indicate the differential response between aligned and misaligned CEOs towards distance-increasing elections.

Figure 5 reports the results from this event study. Each row represents a dependent variable, and each column represents the coefficients of $Aligned\ CEO_{it} \times \Delta Distance_{ect} \times 1_{t=e_t+k}$ and $Aligned\ CEO_{it} \times Distance\ Inc_{ect} \times 1_{t=e_t+k}$, respectively. We show that, prior to a close election, aligned CEOs do not decrease their import consistently more than misaligned CEOs. At $t-2$, aligned firms have lower import volume and shipment than misaligned firms, but this difference does not seem to represent a gradual trend and reverts at $t-1$. The lack of pre-trend is reassuring, suggesting that the election results are not well-anticipated, or driven by slow-moving economic conditions. Following a distance-increasing election, politically aligned CEOs substantially reduce import from the election country more than politically misaligned CEOs, both along extensive and intensive margins.

FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE

Finally, we separately examine the dynamic impacts of distance-increasing and distance-decreasing elections on firm import decisions. Separating these two types of elections helps reveal whether increases and decreases in ideological distances generate symmetric effects. We estimate the following model:

$$\begin{aligned} Import_{eipct} = &\sum_{k=-4}^{4} \gamma_k Aligned\ CEO_{it} \times Distance\ Inc_{ect} \times 1_{t=e_t+k} \\ &+ \sum_{k=-4}^{4} \delta_k Aligned\ CEO_{it} \times Distance\ Dec_{ect} \times 1_{t=e_t+k} + \gamma_{icp} + \tau_{cpt} + \epsilon_{ipct}, \quad (6) \end{aligned}$$

where γ_k and δ_k capture the differential import adjustments between politically aligned and misaligned CEOs following distance increasing close elections and distance-decreasing close elections, respectively.

Figure 4 depicts the estimates from this analysis. Patterns from our event study suggest that the extensive margin of import decisions and import shipments respond to both distance-increasing and distance-decreasing elections. While effects seem quantitatively larger for

distance-decreasing elections, the coefficients are also estimated less precisely. There is no clear pattern showing that import volume responds to foreign elections. The evidence is broadly consistent with the argument that politically aligned firms cut import and reduce the number of shipments to a greater extent than misaligned firms following distance-increasing elections. Aligned firms also initiate import and increase the number of shipments more than misaligned firms following distance-decreasing elections. It is also reassuring that we do not detect any pre-trends for either outcome variable or election type.

FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE

4.3. Identification using 2016 U.S. Election

Our second identification strategy relies on the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, a watershed event that marked dramatic polarization in the U.S. and triggered unanticipated changes in the U.S. political regime, including its global alliances. This election also switches the political alignment between a CEO and the U.S. administration: Republican CEOs switched from misaligned to aligned, while Democrat CEOs switched from aligned to misaligned. Thus, we expect that after the 2016 election, Republican CEOs exhibit an increasing degree of friendshoring relative to Democrat CEOs.

We estimate the differential effect of the 2016 U.S. election on Republican and Democrat CEOs using following model:

$$Import_{ipct} = \beta Distance_{ct} \times Rep\,CEO_i + \gamma Distance_{ct} \times Rep\,CEO_i \times Post_t + \gamma_{ip} + \phi_{ipt} + \tau_{pt} + \epsilon_{ipct}, \tag{7}$$

where $Tension_{ct}$ captures the geopolitical tension between a source country c with the U.S. during year t. We allow this variable to change during the event window to capture the shifting global alliances between the U.S. and other countries around the election. *Rep CEO* indicates Republican CEOs, and *Post* indicates years after 2016. We retain years from 2014 to 2018 in this testing sample to avoid the effect from being contaminated by other elections. The coefficient of interest is γ, which captures the differential import response to geopolitical tension between Republican and Democrat CEOs following the 2016 election.

Table 8 reports the results. Following the 2016 election, Republican (aligned) CEOs significantly reduce their import from adversarial countries compared to Democrat (misaligned)

CEOs. This differential adjustment manifests both in the extensive margin (6 percentage points) and the intensive margin (53% in volume and 37% in shipments). This finding provides further support for the interpretation that firms headed by politically aligned CEOs "friendshore" to a greater extent than those with misaligned CEOs.

TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE

4.4. Identification using Coups

Our third identification approach exploits coup d'états in foreign countries. A coup d'état is a sudden, forceful overthrow of an existing government by a small group. When successful, coups can lead to the establishment of new governments. Even attempted and failed coups represent major political shocks that can lead to changes in government foreign policies and international relations (Marinov and Goemans, 2014). The surprising nature of coups makes them a desirable setting to study how sudden changes in geopolitical tensions surrounding a source country affect the import decisions by politically aligned and misaligned firms.

Data on coup d'états come from Marshall and Marshall (2022). During our sample period, there are only 30 events. Similar to method used for the event study for close foreign elections (Section 4.2.1), we classify coups that push a country to become friendlier or more adversarial towards the U.S., and construct a stacked event sample for each coup. For each event, we track firms' import decisions during the [-4, +4] event window and examine whether firms increase (decrease) import from countries that become friendlier (more adversarial) towards the U.S.

Table 9 reports the results. Following coups that makes a source country more adversarial towards the U.S., aligned firms become 12% less likely to import from that country compared to misaligned firms. They also reduce import volume and shipments by 46% and 34%, respectively.

TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE

4.5. The Role of Board of Directors

A long literature in corporate governance documents that the board of directors have important influence over corporate decisions, both directly and through disciplining executives. We gauge the moderating role of the partisanship of the board. We conjecture that CEOs'

partisanship should matter less in shaping firms' global supply chains when the board of directors do not share the same political views as the CEO. To do so, we calculate the percentage of board members that are affiliated with the same party as the CEO, i.e., 0–25%, 25–50%, 50–75%, and 75–100%. We then define a dummy variable indicating whether the firm falls into each quartile group.[19] We estimate the following model to test our conjecture:

$$Import_{ipct} = \sum_{k=1}^{4} \beta_k Distance_{ct} \times 1_k + \sum_{k=1}^{4} \delta_k Aligned\ CEO_{it} \times Distance_{ct} \times 1_k + \phi_{ipt} + \gamma_{icp} + \tau_{cpt} + \epsilon_{ipct}, \quad (8)$$

where $k(= 1, 2, 3, 4)$ indicates one of the four groups for the percentage of board members in alignment with the CEO. The coefficient of interest is δ_k, which indicates the moderating effects of board-CEO alignment in affecting partisan CEOs' responses to geopolitical risk. In this analysis, we only consider firms with Democrat or Republican CEOs, and board members affiliated with those parties.

Figure 6 plots the estimates of δ_k from this analysis for the four groups. We find that "friendshoring" is absent among firms where the vast majority of board members have contrasting political views to those of the CEO, i.e., over three quarters of board members are affiliated with the opposite party. This result suggests that CEOs' powers are constrained by board members when they hold different political beliefs, and highlights the perils of forming "echo chambers" among decision-makers of the firm.

FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE

In Appendix Table IA.5, we compare the effects of CEO political alignment and board alignment with the U.S. President. We find that CEOs' alignment significantly affects friendshoring strategies, while board-U.S. President alignment does not. This suggests that CEOs' political beliefs are unique determinants of global supply-chain decisions, even when one accounts for the political leanings of board members.

[19] Note that there is some correlation between CEOs' partisanship and board partisanship, consistent with the trend of decreasing political diversity among corporate leadership (Fos et al., 2025).

5. "Friendshoring" and Shareholder Value

How do firms' import responses to geopolitical tensions impact shareholder value? The answer is far from obvious. Friendshoring can improve firm value if shareholders of aligned companies agree with their CEO that it is risky to maintain imports from antagonistic countries. It can also decrease firm value if aligned CEOs cut imports from antagonistic countries for ideological or non-economic reasons, or if shareholders perceive the benefits and costs of friendshoring differently from their CEO.

We answer this question using an event study. Leveraging foreign elections that alter the ideological distances between a foreign country and the U.S., we compute the cumulative announcement returns (CARs) of firms that have import exposures from the election countries.[20] As discussed in Section 4.2.1, foreign elections are classified as distance-increasing or decreasing. CARs are computed based on the abnormal returns against the Fama-French three-factor model during the [-5, +5]-day window centered on the election date.

We perform these analyses on three sets of firms. The first set of firms sourced at least 1% of their imports from the electing countries during the year before the election (*Affected Firms*). Next, we consider firms that sourced at least 5% of their import from the electing countries in the pre-election year (*Heavily Affected Firms*). Finally, we look at a placebo sample consisting of firms for whom less than 1% of the import comes from any electing countries (*Unaffected Firms*).

We first note that in unreported summary statistics the foreign-election CARs are economically small for the average affected firm, with around 0.002 for distance-increasing and 0.004 for distance-decreasing elections. The difference between the two is also statistically insignificant. However, the average effect may mask important heterogeneity across aligned and misaligned firms. We regress firms' foreign election CARs on the interaction terms *Aligned CEO* $\times$ *Distance Inc* and *Aligned CEO* $\times$ *Distance Dec*. These two terms represent the value implications of the decisions by aligned CEOs following distance-increasing and distance-decreasing elections, absorbing the main effect of *Aligned CEO*. The regression controls for election fixed effects and firm fixed effects, thus absorbing the main effect of *Distance Inc*, and *Distance Dec*. Standard errors are double clustered by firm and the electing country.

[20] We do not focus on close elections here because in a firm-level analysis, using only close elections would result in a small sample and limit statistical power.

Results are presented in Panel A of Table 6. While firms exposed to distance-increasing elections on average do not experience any equity value loss, those with politically aligned CEOs do. Among affected firms (i.e., 1% import exposure), distance-increasing elections reduce the equity valuation of aligned firms by 1.6 percentage points more compared to misaligned firms. This gap in value loss reaches 2.6 percentage points among heavily affected firms (i.e., 5% import exposure).[21] These results suggest that friendshoring can be detrimental to shareholder value, potentially because shareholders do not share the political preferences of their CEOs or disagree with their perception of benefit-cost tradeoff of such a strategy. In contrast, there is no effect from either distance-increasing or distance-decreasing elections among unaffected firms (i.e., less than 1% import exposure). This helps allay the concern that our results might reflect the generic effect of global conflicts on partisan firms.

Table 6 About Here

In Panel B, we evaluate the moderating role of the board of directors. In Section 4.5, we show that in a firm where the majority of the board members hold opposing political views to the CEO, the effect of CEOs' political alignment on firms' global supply chain responses to geopolitical risks becomes weaker. In that case, shareholders should be less concerned about firm performance and discount firms' equity value to a lesser extent. We test this conjecture by regressing election CARs on the full interaction of *Distance Inc (Distance Dec)*, *Aligned CEO*, and indicators for the percentage of board members that are politically aligned with the CEO. Results indicate a close-to-zero share value reaction to foreign elections when the majority of the board is not politically aligned with the CEO, while a strong, negative value reaction to distance-increasing elections when the majority of the board as well as the CEO are aligned with the U.S. President. This result reinforces the argument that the political view of the board can help balance CEOs' views.

In Table 7, we examine whether the same foreign elections lead to differential changes in operating performance by aligned and misaligned firms. Specifically, aligned firms, who

[21] These magnitudes closely align with Fisman et al. (2014), who find that Japanese firms with high exposure to China saw stock value declines of 0.8% to 2.1% during periods of heightened Sino-Japanese tensions. Our results also compare to Wagner et al. (2018) who report that firms with significant foreign operations experienced a 2.15 percentage point lower cumulative return through year-end after Trumps election relative to domestically focused firms. Additionally, our estimates fall within the broader literature on political connections (e.g., Fisman, 2001; Goldman et al., 2009).

tend to switch to friendly sourcing countries, exhibit a reduction in gross margin following distance-increasing elections, while misaligned firms do not. This result is consistent with the notion that politically friendly countries do not always provide low-cost products, and can provide a rationale for the reduction in equity value for aligned firms.

TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE

6. Economic Mechanisms

In this section, we explore several potential mechanisms that could contribute to our findings. First, aligned firms may perceive higher levels of geopolitical risk. Second, aligned firms may have greater concerns regarding the national security risk associated with importing from an antagonistic country. Third, aligned CEOs may cut import from antagonistic countries due to their patriotic alignment and thus to demonstrate support for the administration. Fourth, aligned CEOs may weaken trade relations from ideologically distant countries to capture or preserve economic rents arising from their alliance with the U.S. government. Lastly, our results may be driven by foreign suppliers disfavoring aligned firms when international relationships worsen. We discuss these mechanisms in turn.

6.1. Perceived Geopolitical Risk

We assess whether aligned CEOs perceive higher geopolitical risks than misaligned CEOs following a rise in geopolitical tensions along their supply chain. We rely on a measure of firms' geopolitical risk perceptions (GPR) that is constructed by counting the mentions of adverse geopolitical events and risks in firms' quarterly earnings calls (Hassan et al., 2019; Caldara and Iacoviello, 2022). Given that this measure may differ across firms due to intrinsic firm characteristics, we do not make cross-firm comparisons, but instead examine within-firm changes in geopolitical risk perceptions following changes in geopolitical tensions in their supply chain. Similar to the CAR analysis in Section 5, we rely on foreign elections in firms' source countries as quasi-exogenous shocks to their exposure to geopolitical tension. We construct a firm-by-election panel and perform these analyses on affected firms (at least 1% import exposure), heavily affected firms (at least 5% import exposure), and unaffected firms (lower than 1% exposure). Using an event-study approach, we estimate the following

regression:

$$\Delta GPR_{i,t_e} = \beta_1 Distance\ Inc_{c,i,t} \times Aligned\ CEO_{i,t_e} + \beta_2 Aligned\ CEO_{i,t_e} + \alpha_i + \tau_e + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (9)$$

where i represents a firm, e an election and t_e the year of the election. $Distance\ Inc_{c,i,t}$ is an indicator equal to one if a source country of firm i experiences an election that pushes it away from the U.S. in terms of voting ideology.[22] $\Delta GPR_{i,t}$ is the change in firm i's average perceived geopolitical risks one semester (two quarters) before and after the foreign election. Given that a firm can be exposed to more than one foreign elections, and an election can affect multiple firms, we control for both firm fixed effects and election fixed effects. Standard errors are double clustered by firm and the election country. The coefficient of interest is β_1, which represents the differential perceptions by aligned and misaligned firms facing the same change in geopolitical tension from source countries.

Results are presented in Table 10. Columns (1) and (2) report results for affected firms (i.e., 1% import exposure), columns (3) and (4) report results for heavily affected firms (i.e., 5% import exposure) and columns (5) and (6) report results for unaffected firms (i.e., less than 1% import exposure). In each sample, we progressively include more fixed effects, starting with the year of the election fixed effects and firm fixed effects, and finally controlling for election fixed effects and firm fixed effects. Note that the sample sizes are smaller than those in Table 6 because we require firms to have geopolitical risk perception data. For both samples of affected firms and heavily affected firms, and across all specifications (i.e., columns (1) to (4)), we find a significant, positive coefficient on *Distance Inc* × *Aligned CEO*, suggesting that aligned firms perceive heightened geopolitical risk following distance-increasing elections from source countries. In contrast, there is no such differential effect among unaffected firms (i.e., less than 1% exposure). This result lends some support for the risk-perception explanation.

TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE

[22] We verify that the average aligned and misaligned firms are exposed to similar increases in geopolitical distances between their source country (the election country) and the U.S. Specifically, aligned firms experience a 0.065 increase in ideological distance, while misaligned firms experience a 0.072 increase. The difference (0.007) is economically small and statistically insignificant.

6.2. National Security Concerns

Next, we consider the possibility that aligned CEOs may consider adversarial countries a greater threat to national security, and thus divert their global sourcing operations away from those countries. To evaluate this possibility, we examine whether our effects are stronger for firms operating in defense industries and for defense-related products such as arms and ammunition. We define *Defense Firms* based on the list of defense firms from Goyal et al. (2002), and define *Defense Product* if the product is classified by the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) in their Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) for importers as (1) Vehicles, Aircraft, Vessels and Associated Transport Equipment or (2) Arms and Ammunition; Parts and Accessories Thereof. Consistent with the conjecture that aligned CEOs' responses to geopolitical tensions are related to national security concerns, Table 11 shows that such responses are more pronounced among defense firms and for defense products.

TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE

6.3. "Following the Flag" Effect

We next evaluate the explanation that aligned CEOs may cut imports from antagonistic countries to show support for the administration. This channel is unrelated to risk perceptions or information about future gains from trade, but may arise from nationalistic preferences or patriotic alignment considerations. This argument suggests that among politically aligned CEOs, those with stronger patriotic sentiments should be more likely to engage in "friendshoring" practices.

We gauge CEOs' patriotic alignment by whether they contribute to veteran causes. Individuals' donation data come from L2. We regress firms' import decisions on the triple interaction of *Distance*, *Aligned CEO*, and *Veteran Donor*, an indicator for whether a CEO donates to veteran causes. Table 12 reports the results. Across both measures of import decisions, our results are significantly stronger among veteran donors than non-donors. Our evidence is in support of the "following-the-flag" effect, whereby aligned firm CEOs support the U.S. administration by adjusting firm policies towards the directions advocated by the administration.

TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE

6.4. Preservation of Economic Interest

The third mechanism suggests that politically aligned managers may seek to preserve economic rents from their relationships with the U.S. government by shifting their global supply chain networks away from countries exhibiting increasing tensions against the U.S. In the absence of direct measures for firm-level political rents, we compare firms with and without government procurement contracts. Government contracts are highly valuable purchase agreements, and the allocation of government contracts has been shown to be associated with political connections and favoritism (Goldman et al., 2013; Esqueda et al., 2019; Brogaard et al., 2021). Thus, if firms indeed organize their global supply chain choices to preserve political rents, we expect aligned firms who are also government contractors to exhibit a stronger response compared to other aligned firms.

To test this idea, we regress firm import decisions on the full interaction of *Aligned CEO*, *Distance*, and an indicator *Have Gov Contract*, which turns to one if a firm has any government contracts during the previous three years, and zero otherwise. We do not observe significant differences in aligned firms' import responses to geopolitical risk, regardless of whether they are government contractors. Interestingly, we find that government contractors import more from adversarial countries than non-contractors. This is consistent with evidence in Cen et al. (2024) that government contractors transact more with sanctioned countries.

Taken together, our finding casts doubt on the argument that our results are driven by aligned CEOs seeking to preserve political rents.

Table 13 About Here

6.5. Supply-side Determinants and the Role of Large Firms

Finally, we consider the possibility that our findings may be driven by U.S. geopolitical rivals imposing harsh trade terms on firms headed by aligned CEOs. We first note that various parts of our results can already alleviate this concern. For example, the evidence that political diversity among board and CEOs weakens the partisan friendshoring effect suggests the role of internal governance mechanisms. The enhanced effects among nationalistic CEOs highlight the decision power of U.S. importers. Moreover, the fact that our results hold similarly under Obama administration and Trump administration suggests that the effects

are not dominated by the polarized U.S. global relationships in recent years.

We further discuss a specific concern, i.e., some large U.S. firms have sizable influence over geopolitical events and concurrently receive special treatments in countries where they source inputs. This argument suggests that our effects should be concentrated over large firms and nearly absent among smaller firms. To assess this argument, we separately examine the effect for large and small firms, whereby large (small) firms are defined based on asset sizes being above (below) or below the sample median. Results in Table 14 suggest that the overall effects are similar in large and small firms. This finding helps allay the concern that our findings are purely driven by the political influence of mega firms.

Table 14 About Here

In Table **??**, we present the extensive and intensive margin results for large and small firms. Interestingly, geopolitical tensions significantly reduce the likelihood of import (i.e., extensive margin) only for large, aligned firms, but not for small ones. This contrast likely indicates that large firms have more global sourcing options and can more easily switch source countries than small firms.

7. Additional Analyses and Robustness

In this section, we present numerous additional analyses, examining the robustness of our results across alternative measures, estimation methods, and sampling choices.

7.1. Alternative Measures of Geopolitical Tension

We conduct several exercises to verify the robustness of our baseline results to alternative measures of geopolitical tension.

We utilize two additional measures of geopolitical tensions between a source country and the U.S. The first measure captures the degree of political conflict between countries using the GDELT Project data that gathers global events through international news sources. As explained in Section 2.4, we focus on conflict events initiated by governments, and compute the share of bilateral events between the U.S. and a source country that represent governmental conflicts. The second measure is the *Political Distance* from Berry et al. (2010), which captures institutional differences between countries in their political systems and stability.

We re-estimate Equation (3), regressing firm import quantities on the interaction between *Aligned CEO* and *%Conflict Event* as well as *Political Distance*.

Table IA.6 reports the results. We find the coefficients on both *Aligned CEO* × *%Conflict Event* and *Aligned CEO* × *Political Distance* to be significantly negative. The estimates indicate that a one-standard-deviation increase in the share of conflict events is associated with a 8% greater reduction in import volume, and a 4% greater reduction in import shipments by aligned CEOs relative to misaligned CEOs. A one-standard-deviation increase in political distance generates similar effects: a 9% (4%) greater reduction in import volume (shipments) by aligned CEOs.

These results are reassuring as they indicate that our findings are not purely driven by idiosyncratic patterns in voting decisions at the General Assembly, but instead shaped by international conflicts.

Moreover, in Table IA.7, we verify that our results are robust to controlling for other measures of institutional distance between countries as measured in Berry et al. (2010): *Economic Distance*, *Administrative Distance*, *Demographic Distance*, and *Geographic Distance*.

7.2. Alternative Measures of CEO Partisan Leaning

CEOs' partisan alignment can be reflected in multiple aspects of political activities, including registering to vote in a party, voting in the primaries of a party, and donate to political campaigns. As discussed in Section 2.2, CEOs' voting histories and voter registration records are highly correlated, with around 94% of CEOs having identical party recognition in their voter registration records and voting actions. The degree of overlap is relatively lower between voting histories and political contribution. Around 49% of CEOs in our sample do not have political donation records. CEOs that do make donations generally donate to their own party. In Table IA.4, we show that our main findings emerge when CEOs' political alignment is measured by their contributions, although the effect on the extensive margin becomes statistically insignificant. However, when we include both alignment measures (based on voting histories and contribution data), the effects from political contribution weaken.

7.3. An Alternative Measure of Firm Partisanship

We consider an alternative measure of firms' partisanship utilizing the contribution made by a firm to political campaigns (Goldman et al., 2009; Babenko et al., 2020). A firm is classified as Democratic (Republican) if the majority of its campaign contribution goes to the Democratic (Republican) party candidates. Political alignment is then measured as whether the firm's party coincides with the President's party (i.e., *Aligned Firm (Contribution)*).

We note some potential drawbacks in measuring firms' political leaning based on campaign contributions. First, only around 25% of our sample firms have ever made political contributions through their political action committee (PAC) to political campaigns.[23] Second, as noted in Cooper et al. (2010), the majority of firms contribute to both the Democratic and Republican parties.[24] Despite these issues, there is a large overlap between CEO partisanship and firm partisanship based on campaign contribution data.

We merge firm import data from Panjiva with their political contributions data from the FEC and repeat our baseline analysis from Table 3 on this sample, while replacing CEO alignment with firm contribution alignment. Panel A of Table IA.8 reports the results. We continue to find that politically aligned firms cut imports from ideologically distant countries more than politically misaligned firms. However, these effects are generally weaker in statistical significance compared to those based on CEO voter registration records.

Do CEOs' political beliefs play a unique role in shaping global supply-chain decisions? Or does their influence overlap with that of firm alignment, as approximated by campaign contributions? To answer these questions, we run a "horse race" between the partisanship of CEOs and the alignment of firm campaign contributions, regressing firm imports on the interaction of both measures with the ideological distances between countries, i.e., *Distance*. In Panel B of Table IA.8, we find that *Aligned CEO* $\times$ *Distance* continues to generate a negative and statistically significant coefficient despite the control for *Aligned Firm (Contribution)* and its interaction with the ideological distances of the U.S. with a foreign country. This evidence suggests that the political ideology of CEOs generates a profound influence

[23] Cooper et al. (2010) document that, only 9.49% of firms listed on the combined CRSP/Compustat database participate in the contribution process and these tend to be very large firms. The ratio is different in our setting because the sample firms are different (importing firms and combined CRSP/Compustat firms), and the sample period is different (2007 to 2020 and 1979 to 2004).

[24] In our sample, among the firm-year observations with available contribution data, in 83% of the cases, firms contribute to both the Democratic and Republican party.

on firm decisions that is distinct from their firms' political orientation.

7.4. Alternative Measures of Import Quantity

Next, we test the robustness of our results when we use alternative measures of import quantity, weights and number of containers. We show in Table IA.9 that our results continue to hold, i.e., higher ideological distance reduces the total weight (number of containers) of goods imported by aligned firms more than those imported by misaligned firms. Estimates in column (4), Panel A (Panel B) of Table IA.9 suggest that a one-standard-deviation increase in ideological distance is associated with a 11% (8%) greater reduction in import weights (number of containers) by aligned firms compared to misaligned firms.

7.5. Alternative Samples

Our data only covers maritime transactions, which is the largest mode of transport by value and accounts for nearly 50% of the value of U.S. imports. At the same time, our data may omit a large fraction of imports from Canada and Mexico, where goods can be transported to the U.S. via land (Flaaen et al., 2023). To evaluate how much the omission of land import affects our results, we repeat the baseline analysis while excluding data from Canada and Mexico. Results are presented in Panel A of Table IA.10. In this sample, we continue to find that politically aligned CEOs significantly reduce imports from countries that increased their ideological distance from the U.S. more than misaligned CEOs. The coefficient estimates from this sample are also in line with our baseline result.

Next, we verify whether our results are primarily driven by a few highly antagonistic countries such as China and Russia. In Panel B of Table IA.10, we show that our results remain robust in a sample excluding imports from China and Russia, which are considered to be the main antagonistic global powers. Moreover, in Table IA.11, we separately estimate our effects for countries whose ideological distance from the U.S. is above or below the sample median, and find similar effects. Collectively, these results indicate that our effects are not purely driven by these most extreme antagonistic countries. Instead, firms' political ideology remains an important determinant for their import decisions from many countries, including ones relatively friendly with the U.S.

7.6. Annual-Frequency Sample

Our main analysis tracks the evolution of firms import decisions over each six-month (i.e., semester) window. We examine the importance of this empirical choice by repeating the baseline analysis in an annual-frequency sample. Table IA.12 reports the results. In this sample, we continue to find a significant effect of CEO partisanship on their firms' import responses to geopolitical tension. This effect is stronger at the intensive margin: A one-standard-deviation increase in ideological distance leads to a 15% reduction in the import volume by aligned firms, and a 10% reduction in import shipments by aligned firms compared to misaligned firms.

8. Conclusion

This paper examines how U.S. firms respond to rising geopolitical tensions in their global supply chain network, and how the political alignment between CEOs and the U.S. administration shapes such responses. As the world becomes increasingly polarized and geopolitical conflicts intensify, understanding how firms navigate these complex dynamics in their global trade relationships has become crucial for both corporate strategy and economic policy.

Utilizing large-scale, granular datasets on firm import and CEO political affiliations, we find that firms cut imports significantly more from source countries that become ideologically divergent from the U.S. (i.e., "friendshoring"). Importantly, we provide the first evidence that this friendshoring response intensifies among firms led by CEOs who are politically aligned with the U.S. administration.

Notably, we find that friendshoring is uniquely driven by CEOs' political ideology rather than by broader firm-level measures of political leaning such as firm-level political contributions or board members' political ideology. At the same time, having opposing ideologies from board members can balance the effects arising from CEOs' political views. Potential explanations for this behavior include heightened perceptions of geopolitical risks and national security concerns among aligned CEOs, as well as their patriotic alignment. Overall, our study underscores the crucial role that individual CEO beliefs and values play in shaping corporate strategy. It also highlights the importance of political diversity among corporate leadership.

Our findings have two implications. First, they suggest that growing political polarization among corporate executives may amplify the economic impacts of geopolitical tensions, potentially accelerating the fragmentation of global supply chains. Second, shareholders view politically motivated supply chain decisions as potentially value-destroying, highlighting the costs of partisan-influenced corporate policies.

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

Panel A: Firms Aggregate Import Pattern



Panel B: Firm Distribution by Industry



Panel C: Sample Distribution by Product

Figure 1: **Firms Aggregate Import Pattern and Sample Distribution by Industry and Product** Panel A plots the aggregate time-series variation in firm import patterns, including the shipping volume (TEUs) and the number of shipments, both in thousands. Panel B plots the distribution of firms across industries (SIC 2-digit code), where the top-10 represented industries are listed. Panel C plots the sample distribution across products, where product is defined using the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) Section codes and the top-10 product categories are listed.



Panel A: Import Volume, All Firms | Panel B: Import Volume, *Aligned CEO* | Panel C: Import Volume, *Misaligned CEO*



Panel D: Import Shipments, All Firms | Panel E: Import Shipments, *Aligned CEO* | Panel F: Import Shipments, *Misaligned CEO*

Figure 2: **Binscatter Plot of Ideological Distance and Trade** This figure plots the relation between total import quantities and ideological distance at the firm-country level. Panels A and D depict this relationship for the full sample, Panels B and E plot it for aligned firms, i.e., firms whose CEOs are affiliated with the same party as the U.S. President, and Panels C and F focus on misaligned firms, i.e., firms whose CEOs are affiliated with a different party from the U.S. President. The x-axis indicates the ideological distance between a source country to the U.S., and the y-axis indicates log of one plus import quantities between each firm and a source country. Import quantities are measured by both total volume and the number of shipments. The dots represent the average import quantities for each decile of ideological distance, and the solid line represents the fitted regression line between the two variables. The regressions control for firm-source country fixed effects.



Panel A: Have Import, Δ*Distance*



Panel B: Have Import, *Distance Inc*



Panel C: Log(Volume), Δ*Distance*



Panel D: Log(Volume), *Distance Inc*



Panel E: Log(Shipment), Δ*Distance*



Panel F: Log(Shipment), *Distance Inc*

Figure 3: **Partisanship Effects on Trade Around Foreign Elections.** This figure plots the results from event studies around close foreign elections, examining the differential effects on the imports of aligned firms and misaligned firms arising from close elections that increase the ideological distance between foreign countries and the U.S. The benchmark group is close elections that decrease the ideological distance. Panels A and B report results for *Have Import*, Panels C and D report results for *Log(Volume)*, and Panels E and F report results for *Log(Shipments)*. The left column presents coefficient estimates from the triple interaction *Aligned CEO* $\times$ Δ*Distance* $\times$ $1_{t=e_t+k}$ in Equation (5). The right column presents coefficient estimates from the interaction *Aligned CEO* $\times$ *Distance Inc* $\times$ $1_{t=e_t+k}$. Within each panel, the blue lines and dots represent the point estimates and the vertical lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals.



Panel A: Have Import



Panel B: Log(Volume)



Panel C: Log(Shipments)

Figure 4: **Partisanship Effects on Trade Around Foreign Elections.** This figure plots the results from event studies around close foreign elections, examining the effects of close elections that increase and decrease the ideological distance between foreign countries and the U.S. on the import decisions of aligned firms and misaligned firms. Each panel presents the results for an import decision, *Have Import*, *Log(Volume)* and *Log(Shipments)*, respectively. The red (blue dashed) lines and dots (diamonds) represent coefficient estimates for the effects of distance-decreasing (distance-increasing) elections. The coefficients correspond to γ_k and δ_k from Equation (6). The vertical lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals.



Panel A: *Have Import*



Panel B: *Log(Volume)*



Panel C: *Log(Shipment)*

Figure 5: **CEO Partisanship and Trade Around the 2016 U.S. Presidential Elections.** This figure plots the results from event studies around the 2016 U.S. Presidential elections, examining the differential change in import decisions by Republican and Democrat CEOs around the U.S. election. The coefficients of interest are the interaction between *Rep CEO*, the indicator for a CEO being Republican, *Distance*, the geopolitical tension between a foreign country and the U.S., and event time indicators. Panel A reports results for *Have Import*, Panel B reports results for *Log(Volume)*, and Panel C reports results for *Log(Shipments)*. Within each panel, the blue lines and dots represent the point estimates and the vertical lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals.



Figure 6: **The Role of Board Alignment with CEO's Party** This figure plots the results analyzing the heterogeneous effects regarding the alignment of board members' political ideology with the CEO. We only include sample firms with CEOs affiliated with the Democrat or Republican party, and with at least one board member affiliated with Democrat or Republican party. The blue diamonds (red dots) represent coefficient estimates for δ_k regarding the import decision of *Log(1+Volume)* and *Log(1+Shipments)* from Equation (8), respectively. The vertical lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals.

Table 1: **Descriptive Statistics**
This table presents summary statistics for the main variables, including trade quantity measures, firm partisanship variables, and ideological distance. The unit of observation is a firm-source country-product-semester. Detailed variable definitions are provided in Appendix IA.1.

Panel A: Trade Data

Variable	N	Mean	Median	Std
Have Import	110,644	0.737	1	0.440
Volume	108,607	36.25	2.110	145.9
Log(Volume)	79,481	1.782	1.792	2.233
Shipments	110,644	9.811	3	21.37
Log(Shipments)	81,518	1.736	1.609	1.262

Panel B: Firm Partisanship

Variable	N	Mean	Median	Std
Aligned CEO	110,644	0.454	0	0.498
Dem CEO	110,644	0.264	0	0.441
Rep CEO	110,644	0.693	1	0.461
Other CEO	110,644	0.043	0	0.202
Aligned Firm (Contribution)	46,490	0.444	0	0.497

Panel C: Ideological Distance

Variable	N	Mean	Median	Std
Distance	110,644	2.645	3.012	0.849

Table 2: **Ideological Distance and Trade**

This table reports the effects of ideological distance on the likelihood that a firm imports from a source country, and the quantity of the imports. The sample is a firm-source country-product-semester (6 months) panel. *Volume* (*Shipments*) refers to the total shipment volume in TEUs (number of shipments) of products imported by the firm from a source country in a semester. *Have Import* is an indicator that turns to one if a firm imports a certain product from a source country during a semester. *Distance* represents the ideological distance between a foreign country and the U.S. based on their UN voting patterns (Bailey et al., 2017). See Appendix IA.1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by firm and country. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Dep. Var.:	Extensive Margin		Intensive Margin			
	Have Import		*Log(Volume)*		*Log(Shipments)*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Distance	-0.003	-0.003	-0.126	-0.135	-0.105*	-0.112*
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.115)	(0.111)	(0.061)	(0.060)
Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm×CEO×Country	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Country×Product	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Firm×CEO×Country×Product		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	70,905	70,877	47,949	47,844	49,705	49,606
Adjusted R^2	0.334	0.330	0.632	0.680	0.588	0.639

Table 3: **Geopolitical Tensions and the Import Decisions by Partisan CEOs**

This table examines the effects of geopolitical tension on the import decisions of partisan firms. The sample is a firm-source country-product-semester panel. Panel A and the "Extensive Margin" tests of Panel B use the full sample, which includes all firm-country-product pairs with active import transactions, i.e., firm-country-product pairs with positive import volume for more than 50% of the time. The "Intensive Margin" tests of Panel B includes only observations with positive import volume. *Volume* (*Shipments*) refers to the total shipment volume in TEUs (number of shipments) of products imported by the firm from a source country in a semester. *Have Import* is an indicator that turns to one if a firm imports a certain product from a source country during a semester. *Distance* represents the ideological distance between a foreign country and the U.S. based on their UN voting patterns (Bailey et al., 2017). *Aligned CEO* is an indicator that equals one if a firm's CEO is affiliated with the same party as the U.S. President, and zero otherwise. See Appendix IA.1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by firm and country. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Panel A: Extensive and Intensive Margin Effects

Dep. Var.:	Extensive Margin			Intensive Margin					
	Have Import			*Log(Volume)*			*Log(Shipments)*		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Distance	-0.000	-0.001		-0.075	-0.125		-0.069	-0.107*	
	(0.021)	(0.022)		(0.113)	(0.111)		(0.059)	(0.059)	
Distance×*Aligned CEO*	-0.018**	-0.018**	-0.024***	-0.070**	-0.073**	-0.154**	-0.044**	-0.051**	-0.084**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.061)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.041)
Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm×CEO×Country	Yes			Yes			Yes		
Firm×CEO×Country×Product		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
Country×Product×Time			Yes			Yes			Yes
Observations	70,905	70,877	55,367	47,950	47,844	34,996	49,705	49,606	36,197
Adjusted R^2	0.337	0.330	0.311	0.593	0.680	0.655	0.534	0.639	0.634

Panel B: Overall Import Quantities, Poisson and IHT Estimations

Estimation Method:	*Poisson*				*IHT*			
Dep. Var.:	*Volume*		*Shipments*		*Volume*		*Shipments*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Distance	-0.120		-0.022		-0.171*		-0.128*	
	(0.118)		(0.056)		(0.099)		(0.066)	
Distance×*Aligned CEO*	-0.128**	-0.028	-0.092***	-0.111**	-0.098**	-0.125***	-0.084***	-0.097**
	(0.065)	(0.126)	(0.027)	(0.047)	(0.038)	(0.044)	(0.029)	(0.039)
Firm×Product×Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm×CEO×Country×Product FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country×Product×Time FE		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	63,736	48,259	65,870	49,860	68,962	53,743	70,877	55,367
(Pseudo) R^2	0.912	0.954	0.778	0.826	0.768	0.850	0.745	0.832

Table 4: **Are the Effects Driven by CEO Party**
This table examines the effects of geopolitical tension on the import decisions of partisan firms. Sample and variable definitions are the same as in Table 3. *Rep CEO* (*Dem CEO*) is an indicator that equals one if a firm's CEO is affiliated with the Republican (Democratic) party, and zero otherwise. *Differential Effect* reports the difference between the coefficients of *Distance*×*Rep CEO* and *Distance*×*Dem CEO*. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by firm and country. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Dep. Var.	Extensive Margin		Intensive Margin			
	Have Import		*Log(Volume)*		*Log(Shipments)*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Distance	-0.043		0.131		0.063	
	(0.135)		(0.399)		(0.309)	
Distance×*Rep CEO*	0.054	0.049	-0.311	-0.209	-0.177	-0.229
	(0.134)	(0.154)	(0.390)	(0.450)	(0.329)	(0.299)
Distance×*Dem CEO*	0.007	0.005	-0.176	0.044	-0.190	-0.259
	(0.135)	(0.152)	(0.414)	(0.496)	(0.316)	(0.290)
Differential Effect (Rep − Dem)	0.046	0.044	-0.135	-0.253	0.013	0.030
	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.162)	(0.223)	(0.094)	(0.140)
Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm×CEO×Country×Product	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country×Product×Time		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	70,877	55,367	47,844	34,996	49,606	36,197
Adjusted R^2	0.330	0.310	0.680	0.655	0.639	0.633

Table 5: **Foreign Election Event Study**
This table reports the results regarding the effects of close foreign elections that change the ideological distance between U.S. and a foreign country on public firms' import decisions. The sample is a stacked event sample constructed in the following steps: We start with a set of close elections, whose winning margins fall under the bottom quartile across all foreign elections over our sample period (<4%). For each close foreign election, we gather all firms that ever import from that country over our sample period, and then stack all such election events together. *Volume* (*Shipments*) refers to the total shipment volume in TEUs (number of shipments) of products imported by the firm from a source country in a semester. $\Delta Distance$ is the changes in the ideological distance between a foreign country and the U.S. during the [-4, +4] event window around the close election. *Distance Inc* is an indicator that turns to one if a close election increases the ideological distance between U.S. and a country. *Aligned CEO* is an indicator that equals one if a firm's CEO is affiliated with the same party as the U.S. President, and zero otherwise. *Post* indicates time periods after the election. See Appendix IA.1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by firm and country. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Dep. Var.:	Extensive Margin		Intensive Margin			
	Have Import		*Log(Volume)*		*Log(Shipments)*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Aligned CEO×Post	-0.011	0.067***	0.309*	0.343	0.056	0.238
	(0.031)	(0.021)	(0.153)	(0.282)	(0.135)	(0.146)
Aligned CEO×ΔDistance×Post	-0.301		-6.900***		-3.162*	
	(0.270)		(1.989)		(1.511)	
Aligned CEO×Distance Inc×Post		-0.124***		-0.450		-0.417**
		(0.021)		(0.314)		(0.142)
Firm×Election×Product	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	44,441	44,441	7,031	7,031	7,481	7,481
Adjusted R^2	0.118	0.119	0.628	0.627	0.571	0.571

Table 6: **Stock Market Reactions Around Foreign Elections**
This table reports the stock market reactions around foreign elections. The sample is a firm by foreign election panel. *CAR[-5, 5]* is the cumulative abnormal return during the [-5, 5]-day window around each foreign election, relative to the Fama-French three-factor model. *Distance Inc* (*Distance Dec*) is an indicator that turns to one if an election increases (decreases) the ideological distance between the U.S. and a country. *Aligned CEO* is an indicator that equals one if a firm's CEO is affiliated with the same party as the U.S. President, and zero otherwise. The *Affected Firms* (*Heavily Affected Firms*) sample includes all firm-election pairs where the firm's import over 1% (5%) of its total volume (TEUs) from the election country during the year before the election. The *Unaffected Firms* sample includes firm-election pairs where the firm source less than 1% (including 0) of its import from those countries. Panel B analyzes the role of board alignment with CEO's party in affecting firm equity value, using the *Affected Firms* sample. *Low Board-CEO Alignment* (*High Board-CEO Alignment*) is an indicator that equals one if the percentage of board members that are affiliated with the same party as the CEO is below (above) 50%. In this analysis we only consider Democrat and Republican board members, and retain observations with CEOs and at least one board member affiliated with the Democrat or Republican party. See Appendix IA.1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by firm and the electing country. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Panel A: CARs Around Foreign Elections for Aligned and Misaligned Firms

Dep. Var.: *CAR[-5, 5]*	Affected Firms ($\geq$ 1% Exposure)		Heavily Affected Firms ($\geq$ 5% Exposure)		Unaffected Firms ($<$ 1% Exposure)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Aligned CEO×Distance Inc	-0.012**	-0.016***	-0.020***	-0.026***	0.001	-0.000
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Aligned CEO×Distance Dec	0.001	0.003	-0.006	-0.006	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Election	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	2,317	2,110	1,209	976	10,378	10,287
Adjusted R^2	0.034	0.051	0.036	0.052	0.041	0.072

Panel B: The Role of Board Alignment

Dep. Var.: *CAR[-5, 5]*	(1)	(2)
Distance Inc×Aligned CEO×Low Board-CEO Alignment	-0.001	-0.003
	(0.007)	(0.008)
Distance Inc×Aligned CEO×High Board-CEO Alignment	-0.014*	-0.021***
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Distance Dec×Aligned CEO×Low Board-CEO Alignment	0.001	-0.001
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Distance Dec×Aligned CEO×High Board-CEO Alignment	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Lower Interaction Terms	Yes	Yes
Election	Yes	Yes
Firm		Yes
Observations	1,717	1,621
Adjusted R^2	0.056	0.090

Table 7: **Operating Performance around Foreign Elections**
This table reports the results regarding the firm's operating performance and its exposure to distance-increasing and distance-decreasing foreign elections. The sample is a firm by foreign election sample, where we track firms' operating performance over two quarters before and after each election. The dependent variable is the change in firms' average gross margin two quarters before and after the foreign election (Δ*Gross Margin*), where *Gross Margin* is defined as one minus the cost of goods sold divided by sales, based on firms quarterly reports. *Distance Inc* is an indicator that equals one if the foreign election increases the ideological distance between the U.S. and the electing country, and zero otherwise. *Aligned CEO* is an indicator that equals one if a firm's CEO is affiliated with the same party as the U.S. President, and zero otherwise. The sample in columns (1) and (2) (columns (3) and (4)) includes all firm-election pairs where the firm's import over 1% (5%) of its total volume (TEUs) from the election country during the year before the election. The sample in columns (5) and (6) includes firm-election pairs where the firm does not import from the electing countries or source less than 1% of its import from those countries. See Appendix IA.1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by firm and country. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Dep. Var.: Δ*Gross Margin*	Affected Firms ($\geq$ 1% Exposure)		Heavily Affected Firms ($\geq$ 5% Exposure)		Unaffected Firms ($<$ 1% Exposure)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Distance Inc	0.004		0.009		-0.001	
	(0.003)		(0.005)		(0.001)	
Aligned CEO	0.007***	0.008***	0.009**	0.006	-0.000	0.000
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Aligned CEO×*Distance Inc*	-0.009**	-0.010***	-0.017***	-0.015***	0.000	0.000
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Firm	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election Year	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Election		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	1,522	1,508	689	673	8,427	8,427
Adjusted R^2	0.115	0.120	0.022	0.021	0.157	0.159

Table 8: **Event Study: 2016 U.S. Presidential Election**
This table examines the effects of the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election on the import decisions of firms headed by Republican and Democrat CEOs. The sample is a firm-source country-product-semester panel between 2014 second semester and 2018 second semester, i.e., [-4, +4] semesters around the 2016 U.S. Election. *Volume* (*Shipments*) refers to the total shipment volume in TEUs (number of shipments) of products imported by the firm from a source country in a semester. *Aligned CEO* is an indicator that equals one if a firm's CEO is affiliated with the same party as the U.S. President, and zero otherwise. *Post* indicates time periods after the 2016 election. See Appendix IA.1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by firm and source country. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Dep. Var.	*Have Import*		*Log(Volume)*		*Log(Shipments)*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Distance	-0.027		0.140		-0.054	
	(0.063)		(0.172)		(0.112)	
Distance×*Post*	0.006		0.322***		0.247***	
	(0.033)		(0.119)		(0.090)	
Distance×*Rep CEO*	0.029	-0.073	-0.143	-0.221	0.020	-0.003
	(0.065)	(0.078)	(0.211)	(0.211)	(0.150)	(0.194)
Distance×*Rep CEO*×*Post*	-0.022	-0.061*	-0.345**	-0.534**	-0.236**	-0.374**
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.138)	(0.230)	(0.101)	(0.160)
Firm×CEO×Country×Product	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country×Product×Time		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	24,565	19,195	18,185	13,414	18,932	14,046
Adjusted R^2	0.310	0.233	0.745	0.700	0.705	0.678

Table 9: **Event Study: Coup d'États in Foreign Countries**
This table reports the effects of coup d'états in foreign countries on the import decisions of aligned and misaligned firms in the U.S. The sample is a stacked-event sample, with the event window extending from [-4, +4] semesters around coups in a source country. For each event, we gather all firms that ever import from that country over our sample period, and then stack all such events together. *Volume* (*Shipments*) refers to the total shipment volume in TEUs (number of shipments) of products imported by the firm from a source country in a semester. Δ*Distance* is the changes in the ideological distance between a foreign country and the U.S. during the [-4, +4] event window around the coup. *Distance Inc* is an indicator that turns to one if a coup increases the ideological distance between U.S. and a country. *Aligned CEO* is an indicator that equals one if a firm's CEO is affiliated with the same party as the U.S. President, and zero otherwise. *Post* indicates time periods after the 2016 election. See Appendix IA.1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by firm and source country. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Dep. Var.	(1) *Have Import*	(2) *Log(Volume)*	(3) *Log(Shipments)*
Aligned CEO×*Post*	0.042	0.058**	0.061
	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.065)
Distance Inc×*Aligned CEO*×*Post*	-0.120***	-0.456**	-0.331**
	(0.037)	(0.188)	(0.152))
Firm×Coup×Product	Yes	Yes	Yes
Coup×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	16,333	4,250	4,323
Adjusted R^2	0.225	0.655	0.573

Table 10: **Perceived Geopolitical Risk Around Foreign Elections**
This table reports the results regarding the firm's perceived geopolitical risk around distance-increasing and distance-decreasing foreign elections. The sample is a firm by foreign election sample. The dependent variable is the change in firms' average perceived geopolitical risks two quarters before and after the foreign election (ΔGPR), where GPR is constructed by Caldara and Iacoviello (2022) using individual firms' quarterly earnings calls. *Distance Inc* is an indicator that equals one if the foreign election increases the ideological distance between the U.S. and the electing country, and zero otherwise. *Aligned CEO* is an indicator that equals one if a firm's CEO is affiliated with the same party as the U.S. President, and zero otherwise. The sample in columns (1) and (2) (columns (3) and (4)) includes all firm-election pairs where the firm's import over 1% (5%) of its total volume (TEUs) from the election country during the year before the election. The sample in columns (5) and (6) includes firm-election pairs where the firm does not import from the electing countries or source less than 1% of its import from those countries. See Appendix IA.1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by firm and country. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Dep. Var.: ΔGPR	Affected Firms ($\geq$ 1% Exposure)		Heavily Affected Firms ($\geq$ 5% Exposure)		Unaffected Firms ($<$ 1% Exposure)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Distance Inc	0.028		-0.231		-0.011	
	(0.075)		(0.139)		(0.029)	
Aligned CEO	-0.266	-0.256	-0.595**	-0.444**	-0.115*	-0.125*
	(0.184)	(0.167)	(0.244)	(0.174)	(0.066)	(0.069)
Aligned CEO×*Distance Inc*	0.183*	0.165*	0.446**	0.332	0.050	0.065
	(0.094)	(0.095)	(0.185)	(0.218)	(0.045)	(0.048)
Firm	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election Year	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Election		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	1,112	1,095	512	500	6,004	6,004
Adjusted R^2	0.020	0.024	0.143	0.224	0.052	0.050

Table 11: **Defense Firms and Products**

This table reports the differential effects of CEOs' partisan beliefs on their firms' import quantity for defense and non-defense firms and products. Sample and variable definitions are the same as in Table 3. Panel A reports the differential effects for defense products, and Panel B reports the effects for defense firms, where the list of defense firms is from Goyal et al. (2002) and portfolio firms of the following ETFs: iShares US Aerospace & Defense (ITA), Invesco Aerospace & Defense (PPA), SPDR S&P Aerospace & Defense (XAR), and Direxion Daily Aerospace & Defense Bull 3X Shares (DFEN). Defense products are classified as either Section XVII (Vehicles, Aircraft, Vessels and Associated Transport Equipment) or Section XIX (Arms and Ammunition; Parts and Accessories Thereof) by the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS). See Appendix IA.1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by firm and country. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Panel A: Defense Product

Dep. Var.:	*Have Import*		*Log(Volume)*		*Log(Shipments)*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Distance	-0.002		-0.053		-0.077	
	(0.022)		(0.114)		(0.060)	
Distance×*Aligned CEO*	-0.012	-0.017	-0.064*	-0.125*	-0.038*	-0.057
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.035)	(0.068)	(0.022)	(0.042)
Distance×*Defense Product*	0.007		-0.561**		-0.247	
	(0.075)		(0.235)		(0.166)	
Distance×*Aligned CEO*×*Defense Product*	-0.047***	-0.071**	-0.073	-0.363**	-0.108*	-0.332***
	(0.017)	(0.030)	(0.075)	(0.176)	(0.057)	(0.071)
Firm×CEO×Country×Product	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country×Product×Time		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	70,877	55,367	47,844	34,996	49,606	36,197
Adjusted R^2	0.330	0.311	0.680	0.655	0.639	0.634

Panel B: Defense Firm

Dep. Var.:	*Have Import*		*Log(Volume)*		*Log(Shipments)*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Distance	0.009		-0.119		-0.098	
	(0.022)		(0.119)		(0.065)	
Distance×*Aligned CEO*	-0.011	-0.018*	-0.048	-0.143**	-0.033	-0.075*
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.038)	(0.063)	(0.024)	(0.042)
Distance×*Defense Firm*	-0.085*	-0.010	-0.099	-0.291	-0.102	-0.033
	(0.050)	(0.060)	(0.195)	(0.229)	(0.094)	(0.140)
Distance×*Aligned CEO*×*Defense Firm*	-0.056***	-0.049***	-0.207***	-0.110	-0.139***	-0.085**
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.077)	(0.100)	(0.030)	(0.036)
Firm×CEO×Country×Product	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country×Product×Time		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	70,877	55,367	47,844	34,996	49,606	36,197
Adjusted R^2	0.330	0.311	0.680	0.655	0.639	0.634

Table 12: **CEO Donations to Veterans Causes**
This table reports the effects of geopolitical tensions on the importing decisions by partisan firms and CEOs's donations to veteran causes. Sample and variable definitions are the same as in Table 3. *Veteran Donor* is a dummy that equals one if the CEO has donated to veterans causes, and zero otherwise. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by firm and country. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Dep. Var.:	*Have Import*		*Log(Volume)*		*Log(Shipments)*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Distance	-0.001		-0.136		-0.119**	
	(0.022)		(0.113)		(0.058)	
Distance× *Aligned CEO*	-0.017**	-0.023**	-0.062*	-0.140**	-0.046**	-0.070*
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.034)	(0.058)	(0.021)	(0.037)
Distance× *Veteran Donor*	0.014	0.160	0.441*	0.116	0.425*	0.398
	(0.076)	(0.127)	(0.258)	(0.460)	(0.232)	(0.388)
Distance× *Aligned CEO*× *Veteran Donor*	-0.040	-0.049*	-0.392***	-0.424*	-0.192	-0.435***
	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.142)	(0.226)	(0.159)	(0.142)
Firm×CEO×Country×Product	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country×Product×Time		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	70,877	55,367	47,844	34,996	49,606	36,197
Adjusted R^2	0.330	0.311	0.680	0.655	0.639	0.634

Table 13: **Geopolitical Tensions and the Import Decisions of Government Contractors**

This table reports the effects of geopolitical tensions on the importing decisions by firms with and without valuable government contracts. Sample and variable definitions are the same as in Table 3. *Have Gov Contract* is an indicator that equals one if the firm has received a government contract in the past three years. *Top Quartile Gov Contract* (*Top Decile Gov Contract*) is an indicator that equals one if the total value of the government contracts a firm has received in the past three years ranks among the top quartile (decile) of all firms. The sample is a firm-source country-product-semester panel. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by firm and country. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Panel A: Have Government Contract

Dep. Var.:	*Have Import*		*Log(Volume)*		*Log(Shipments)*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Distance	-0.008		-0.183		-0.150**	
	(0.023)		(0.113)		(0.065)	
Distance×*Aligned CEO*	-0.011	-0.021*	-0.085*	-0.170**	-0.052*	-0.080*
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.047)	(0.069)	(0.029)	(0.046)
Distance×*Have Gov Contract*	0.020	0.036	0.137	0.261**	0.106*	0.221***
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.100)	(0.108)	(0.059)	(0.065)
Distance×*Aligned CEO*	-0.020	-0.011	0.024	0.024	-0.003	-0.026
×*Have Gov Contract*	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.078)	(0.095)	(0.043)	(0.044)
Firm×CEO×Country×Product	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country×Product×Time		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	70,877	55,367	47,844	34,996	49,606	36,197
Adjusted R^2	0.330	0.311	0.680	0.655	0.639	0.634

Panel B: High Value Government Contract (Top Quartile)

Dep. Var.:	*Have Import*		*Log(Volume)*		*Log(Shipments)*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Distance	0.001		-0.160		-0.140**	
	(0.025)		(0.107)		(0.065)	
Distance×*Aligned CEO*	-0.014*	-0.021**	-0.065	-0.156**	-0.041	-0.068
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.043)	(0.068)	(0.027)	(0.045)
Distance×*Top Quartile Gov Contract*	-0.005	0.011	0.117	0.204*	0.109	0.221***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.118)	(0.103)	(0.073)	(0.072)
Distance×*Aligned CEO*×*Top Quartile Gov Contract*	-0.014	-0.010	-0.021	0.021	-0.029	-0.045
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.076)	(0.104)	(0.038)	(0.047)
Firm×CEO×Country×Product	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country×Product×Time		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	70,877	55,367	47,844	34,996	49,606	36,197
Adjusted R^2	0.330	0.310	0.680	0.655	0.639	0.634

Panel C: High Value Government Contract (Top Decile)

Dep. Var.:	*Have Import*		*Log(Volume)*		*Log(Shipments)*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Distance	0.003		-0.141		-0.105*	
	(0.023)		(0.108)		(0.059)	
Distance×*Aligned CEO*	-0.015*	-0.020*	-0.067*	-0.144**	-0.046*	-0.071*
	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.039)	(0.061)	(0.024)	(0.042)
Distance×*Top Decile Gov Contract*	-0.031**	-0.036	0.152	0.170	-0.009	0.097
	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.134)	(0.185)	(0.065)	(0.100)
Distance×*Aligned CEO*×*Top Decile Gov Contract*	-0.027	-0.025	-0.073	-0.082	-0.049	-0.102
	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.132)	(0.141)	(0.071)	(0.076)
Firm×CEO×Country×Product	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country×Product×Time		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	70,877	55,367	47,844	34,996	49,606	36,197
Adjusted R^2	0.330	0.311	0.680	0.655	0.639	0.634

Table 14: **The Role of Firm Size**
This table reports the effects of geopolitical tensions on the importing decisions by firms with large and small asset sizes. Sample and variable definitions are the same as in Table 3. *Large* (*Small*) is an indicator that equals one if the firm's lagged asst size is above (below) the sample median, and zero otherwise. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by firm and country. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Dep. Var.:	*Have Import*		*Log(Volume)*		*Log(Shipments)*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Distance×*Small*	-0.002		-0.120		-0.103*	
	(0.023)		(0.112)		(0.058)	
Distance×*Large*	-0.008		-0.148		-0.091	
	(0.033)		(0.326)		(0.145)	
Distance×*Aligned CEO*×*Small*	-0.012	-0.020**	-0.076**	-0.149**	-0.061***	-0.088**
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.032)	(0.062)	(0.021)	(0.041)
Distance×*Aligned CEO*×*Large*	-0.070***	-0.066**	-0.044	-0.242	0.029	-0.043
	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.194)	(0.187)	(0.081)	(0.119)
Differential Effect	0.059**	0.046	-0.032	0.093	-0.089	-0.045
(Small − Large)	[0.028]	[0.030]	[0.194]	[0.189]	[0.084]	[0.115]
Firm×CEO×Country×Product	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country×Product×Time		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	70,477	54,999	47,621	34,820	49,381	36,019
Adjusted R^2	0.329	0.311	0.680	0.654	0.639	0.633

Internet Appendix for Partisan Friendshoring

Meghana Ayyagari, Janet Gao, and Pengfei Ma

This document provides additional data descriptions and robustness tests. Section IA.1 provides variable definitions. Section IA.2 provides additional statistics regarding the procedures and data sources used to construct the sample. Section IA.3 provides results from several additional tests surrounding the baseline analysis. We start by showing our baseline results are robust to alternative samples, where we include all firm-country-product pairs with any import transactions during the sample period, or only include active import transactions, defined as firm-country-product pairs with positive import volume for more than 10% of the time. We then present the standalone effects of CEO alignment and CEO party affiliation on import volume, and then demonstrate the separate effects of CEO affiliation under Democrat and Republican President. We then show the robustness of our results to alternative estimation methods such as Poisson regression and Inverse Hyperbolic Transformation of the dependent variables. We also show the standalone effects of board alignment and the robustness of our main results after controlling for board alignment with the President. We also present intensive and extensive margin evidence for large and small firms. In Section IA.4, we provide results from several robustness tests. Importantly, we show that our results are robust to various changes in measurement, specifications, and sampling methodologies, including (1) alternative measures of geopolitical tension, including global conflict event (GDELT data) and political distance introduced by Berry et al. (2010), and we present results where we additionally control for other measures of distances between countries, including demographic distance, economic distance, administrative distance, and geographic distance; (2) alternative measures of firm alignment, i.e., firms' political campaign contribution; (3) alternative measures of firm import quantities; (4) we decompose our main effect, showing separately how each type of partisan CEOs respond to geopolitical tensions under Democrat and Republican Presidents; (5) alternative samples that exclude imports from China and Russia, or exclude imports from Mexico and Canada. We provide additional evidence regarding the effects for countries with above- and below-median ideological distances, and firms with above- and below-median asset sizes; and (6) an annual-frequency sample.

IA.1. Variable Definitions

- *Have Import*: An indicator variable that equals one if a firm imports a certain product from a source country during a semester, and zero otherwise. Data source: Panjiva.
- *Volume*: The total shipment volume in twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) for a certain product imported by a firm from a source country during a semester. If the firm does not import the product from a country and semester, the volume is set to zero. The variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Data source: Panjiva.
- *Shipments*: The total number of shipments of a certain product imported by a firm from a source country during a semester. If the firm does not import the product from a country and semester, the number of shipments is set to zero. The variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Data source: Panjiva.
- *Aligned CEO*: An indicator variable that equals one if a CEO's party affiliation is the same as the party of the U.S. president, and zero otherwise. CEO's party affiliation is determined based on their voting history in national primaries. Data source: Capital IQ and L2, Inc.
- *Dem CEO*: An indicator variable that equals one if a CEO is affiliated with the Democratic party, and zero otherwise. Data source: Capital IQ and L2, Inc.
- *Rep CEO*: An indicator variable that equals one if a CEO is affiliated with the Republican party, and zero otherwise. Data source: Capital IQ and L2, Inc.
- *Other CEO*: An indicator variable that equals one if a CEO is affiliated with the other parties (neither the Republican party nor the Democrat party), and zero otherwise. Data source: Capital IQ and L2, Inc.
- *High (Low) Board-CEO Alignment*: An indicator that equals one if more (less) than 50% of the board members are affiliated with a different party from the CEO. In computing this measure, we only account for Democrat and Republican board members. Data source: Capital IQ and L2, Inc. Board member identities are obtained from Capital IQ and board member's affiliation data are obtained from the voting history in national primaries, provided by L2, Inc.
- *Aligned Firm (Contribution)*: An indicator variable that equals one if a firm contributes more to the party of the U.S. president during the most recent two-year election cycle. Data source: Federal Election Commission (FEC).
- *Distance*: The ideal point distances between the U.S. and importing country based on countries voting behavior in the UN General Assembly (Bailey et al., 2017). Data source: Voeten (2013).

- Δ*Distance*: The changes in the ideological distance between an import source country and the U.S. following the close election. Data source: the Manifesto Project Database (MPD) and Voeten (2013).

- *Distance Inc (Dec)*: An indicator that equals one if the foreign election increases (decreases) the ideological distance between the U.S. and the electing country, and zero otherwise. Data source: the Manifesto Project Database (MPD) and Voeten (2013).

- Δ*Gross Margin*: The change in firms' average gross margin two quarters before and after the foreign election, where *Gross Margin* is calculated as 1 minus the cost of goods sold (*cogs*) divided by sales (*sale*).

- ΔGPR: The change in firms' average perceived geopolitical risks two quarters before and after the foreign election (ΔGPR), where GPR is constructed by Caldara and Iacoviello (2022) using quarterly earnings calls. Data source: Caldara and Iacoviello (2022).

- *Defense*: An indicator that equals one if a firm is a defense firm or if a product is a defensive product. Defense firms are classified based on Goyal et al. (2002). Defense products are the ones classified under Section XVII (Vehicles, Aircraft, Vessels and Associated Transport Equipment) or Section XIX (Arms and Ammunition; Parts and Accessories Thereof) according to the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) classification.

- *Veteran Donor*: An indicator variable that equals one if the CEO has donated to Veterans Causes, and zero otherwise. Data source: L2, Inc.

- *Have Gov Contract*: An indicator that equals one if the firm has received a government contract in the past three years. Data source: USASPENDING.gov.

- *CAR[-5, 5]*: The cumulative abnormal return during the [-5, 5]-*days* time window around the foreign election, calculated using the Fama-French three-factors model. Data source: CRSP.

- *Large (Small) Firm*: an indicator that equals one if the firms lagged asst size is above (below) the sample median, and zero otherwise. Data source: Compustat.

IA.2. Sample Construction and Statistics

IA.2.1. Details on Sample Construction

We construct a sample that tracks firms importing activity following (Smirnyagin and Tsyvinski, 2022) and (Bisetti et al., 2023). We have detailed the sample construction steps below:

1. We start with the universe of shipments imported by U.S. consignees. We drop observations with the missing firm identifier, *conpanjivaid*.

2. We use the cross-reference file (provided by Panjiva) to merge with S&P Capital and obtain the corresponding identifiers (*companyid*). Observations with the missing *companyid* are dropped from the sample.

3. For each firm, we use the following steps to get its ultimate parent *companyid* overtime.

   (a) S&P BECRS provides the cross-reference file between companyid and D&B *DUNS ID*. The *DUNS ID* is the identifier used in NETS, which is panel data where we can track the firms ultimate parent over time.

   (b) For those firms that can not be matched with NETS, we rely on the S&P BECRS Ultimate Parent Point-in-Time package. It tracks the parent-to-subsidiary relationship starting in 2018. For the sample period before 2018, we use the parent-to-subsidiary relationship in 2018, assuming the relationship did not change.

4. We next attempt to obtain *gvkey*, based on the *companyid* of the ultimate parent. For this purpose, we use the crosswalk from BECRS. The crosswalk contains the starting and ending date for every *companyid-gvkey* tuple; we make sure to use the correct concordance depending on the time period. That is, for each year, we keep those tuples that are active in a given year.

5. For the firms that are matched with *companyid* but not matched to its parent *gvkey* following the steps above, we use the cross-reference file between *companyid* and *gvkey* to get their *gvkey* directly.

6. The cross-reference file for *conpanjivaid* and *companyid* only covers less than 15% of Panjiva firms (Flaaen et al., 2023). We supplement this by constructing our own crosswalks, for Panjiva consigees that cannot matched with Capital IQ companies in step 2. We match Panjiva firms with NETS based on geo-located addresses (*Placekey*) and names, then repeat steps 3.a and 4 to get their parent *gvkey*.

7. We drop firms if we observe them making transactions less than 50 percent of the time.

8. To reduce the impact of firms redactions, we drop firms with import volume exceeds the mean plus/minus 3 standard deviations at any point of time. The mean and standard deviation are computed individually for each firm. This way, we try to eliminate companies with big spikes (up or down) in the import volumes; this can (plausibly) result from their redacting activity.

9. When a carrier handles a shipment end-to-end, then this logistic company will be recorded as a consignee. To address this issue, we first use the list of the largest 100 logistic companies and exclude observations where these logistic companies are recorded as consignees. We then drop firms in the transportation industry (SIC first digit = 4).

10. We drop firms from the finance industry (SIC first digit = 6).

11. We add two years (four semesters) before the first year (semester) in which a given firm-country-product pair appears in our sample and extend the panel by two years (four semesters) after the last year in which the pair appears in the data.

12. For our baseline analysis, we only keep active import transactions: we drop firm-product-country pairs if we observe them making transactions less than 50 percent of the time.



Figure IA.1: **CEO Data Coverage by Capital IQ People Intelligence and Execucomp** This figure plots the comparison of CEO data coverage by Capital IQ People Intelligence and Execucomp. We collect firm-year panel data on CEO information from Capital IQ People Intelligence and Execucomp for Compustat U.S. firms, and then outer-join these two data to compare the data coverage. *CIQ Only* indicates the percentage of firms covered only by Capital IQ People Intelligence each year. *Execucomp Only* indicates the percentage of firms covered only by Execucomp each year. *CIQ and Execucomp* indicates the percentage of firms covered by both Capital IQ People Intelligence and Execucomp each year.



Figure IA.2: **Percentage of Firms by Switching Status** This figure plots the percentage of firms that add and/or drop the import of products from at least one source country in a semester. "Add" means that a firm is importing from a new source country that it has not imported from over the past year. "Drop" means that a firm stops importing from an existing source country in the next year. "Add and Drop" means that a firm adds a country and drops a country in the same semester.

IA.3. Baseline Extensions

Table IA.1: **Alternative Definition of "Active Importers"**
This table examines the effects of geopolitical tension on the import decisions of partisan firms using alternative samples of active importers. The sample is a firm-source country-product-semester panel. Panel A includes all firm-country-product trios, and Panel B includes firm-country-product trios with positive import volume for more than 10% of the time. Variable definitions are the same as in Table 3. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by firm and country. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Panel A: All Import Transactions (No Filter)

Dep. Var.	*Log(1+Volume)*		*Log(1+Shipments)*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Distance	-0.071*		-0.063**	
	(0.040)		(0.031)	
Distance×*Aligned CEO*	-0.028**	-0.025**	-0.026***	-0.018**
	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Firm×CEO×Country×Product	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country×Product×Time		Yes		Yes
Observations	571,176	524,755	578,441	532,113
Adjusted R^2	0.538	0.553	0.554	0.562

Panel B: Imports in > 10% Observations

Dep. Var.	*Log(1+Volume)*		*Log(1+Shipments)*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Distance	-0.077*		-0.066**	
	(0.040)		(0.031)	
Distance×*Aligned CEO*	-0.028**	-0.026**	-0.026***	-0.020**
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Firm×CEO×Country×Product	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country×Product×Time		Yes		Yes
Observations	547,928	501,538	555,046	508,721
Adjusted R^2	0.538	0.553	0.553	0.561

Table IA.2: **CEO Party Affiliation and Trade**

This table reports the effect of CEOs partisanship on their firm's import decisions. Sample and variable definitions are the same as in Table 3. *Rep CEO* and *Dem CEO* are indicators for whether a firm's CEO is affiliated with the Republican or Democratic party, respectively. *Rep President* and *Dem President* are indicator variables indicating whether the current U.S. administration is Republican and Democrat, respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by firm and country. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Panel A: CEO Alignment and Firm Import Decisions

					Extensive Margin		Intensive Margin			
Dep. Var.	*Log(1+Volume)*		*Log(1+Shipments)*		*Have Import*		*Log(Volume)*		*Log(Shipments)*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Aligned CEO	0.030	0.008	0.024	0.006	0.013	0.007	-0.030	-0.041	-0.013	-0.015
	(0.070)	(0.058)	(0.051)	(0.042)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.026)
Firm×CEO×Country×Product	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry×Product×Time		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	93,561	82,999	95,314	84,755	95,314	84,755	66,612	57,194	68,136	58,698
Adjusted R^2	0.537	0.584	0.484	0.528	0.193	0.217	0.623	0.627	0.574	0.588

Panel B: CEO Party and Firm Import Decisions

Dep. Var.	*Log(1+Volume)*		*Log(1+Shipments)*		Extensive Margin *Have Import*		Intensive Margin *Log(Volume)*		*Log(Shipments)*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Dem CEO	0.423	0.505**	0.272	0.379***	0.067	0.112	0.280**	0.123	0.158*	0.135
	(0.271)	(0.194)	(0.193)	(0.143)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.121)	(0.159)	(0.093)	(0.133)
Rep CEO	0.221	0.265	0.081	0.138	0.007	0.038	0.083	-0.121	-0.001	-0.063
	(0.233)	(0.170)	(0.165)	(0.123)	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.130)	(0.139)	(0.085)	(0.111)
Firm×Country×Product	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry×Product×Time		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	93,661	83,098	95,377	84,812	95,377	84,812	66,961	57,581	68,483	59,075
Adjusted R^2	0.504	0.555	0.447	0.494	0.154	0.183	0.606	0.611	0.553	0.567

Panel C: CEO Party, President Party, and Import Decisions

Dep. Var.	*Log(1+Volume)*		*Log(1+Shipments)*		Extensive Margin *Have Import*		Intensive Margin *Log(Volume)*		*Log(Shipments)*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Dem CEO×Dem President	0.536	0.543**	0.386	0.444***	0.122	0.144	0.205	0.072	0.184*	0.159
	(0.350)	(0.236)	(0.244)	(0.167)	(0.093)	(0.091)	(0.149)	(0.153)	(0.101)	(0.117)
Dem CEO×Rep President	0.327	0.464**	0.179	0.313**	0.022	0.080	0.324*	0.168	0.141	0.114
	(0.212)	(0.191)	(0.153)	(0.144)	(0.058)	(0.061)	(0.164)	(0.199)	(0.118)	(0.161)
Rep CEO×Dem President	0.268	0.274	0.141	0.179	0.038	0.056	0.005	-0.152	0.013	-0.043
	(0.288)	(0.200)	(0.203)	(0.139)	(0.075)	(0.072)	(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.091)	(0.107)
Rep CEO×Rep President	0.182	0.248	0.034	0.092	-0.017	0.017	0.131	-0.090	-0.009	-0.082
	(0.185)	(0.163)	(0.130)	(0.126)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.157)	(0.167)	(0.094)	(0.128)
Firm×Country×Product	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry×Product×Time		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	93,661	83,098	95,377	84,812	95,377	84,812	66,961	57,581	68,483	59,075
Adjusted R^2	0.504	0.555	0.447	0.494	0.155	0.183	0.606	0.611	0.553	0.567

Table IA.3: **Separating Effects from Republicans and Democrats**
This table reports the effect of CEOs' partisan beliefs on their firms' import quantity. Sample and variable definitions are the same as in Table 3. *Rep President* and *Dem President* are indicator variables indicating whether the current U.S. administration is Republican or Democrat, respectively. *Rep CEO* and *Dem CEO* are indicators for whether a firm's CEO is affiliated with the Republican or Democratic party, respectively. *Other CEO* is an indicator that equals one if the firm's CEO is neither affiliated with the Republican party nor the Democrat party. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by firm and country. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

	Extensive Margin	Intensive Margin	
Dep. Var.	*Have Import*	*Log(Volume)*	*Log(Shipments)*
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Distance×*Rep President*×*Rep CEO*	-0.014	-0.296**	-0.187**
	(0.032)	(0.133)	(0.073)
Distance×*Dem President*×*Rep CEO*	0.006	-0.203	-0.129*
	(0.029)	(0.133)	(0.073)
Distance×*Rep President*×*Dem CEO*	-0.029	-0.009	-0.091
	(0.019)	(0.120)	(0.073)
Distance×*Dem President*×*Dem CEO*	-0.035**	-0.043	-0.124*
	(0.014)	(0.120)	(0.070)
Distance×*Rep President*×*Other CEO*	-0.005	0.094	0.004
	(0.119)	(0.340)	(0.323)
Distance×*Dem President*×*Other CEO*	-0.043	0.132	0.066
	(0.136)	(0.402)	(0.308)
Firm×CEO×Country×Product	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	70,877	47,844	49,606
Adjusted R^2	0.330	0.680	0.639

Table IA.4: **Alignment by CEO Political Contribution**
This table reports the effect of CEOs partisanship on their firm's import decisions, where CEO partisanship is measured by their political contributions. *Aligned CEO* is an indicator that equals one if a CEO has voted in the national primaries of the party of the U.S. President. *Aligned CEO (Contribution)* is an indicator that equals one if the majority of a CEO's political contribution is towards the same party as the U.S. President. *CEO No Contribution* is an indicator that equals one if we do not observe a CEO to make any political contribution. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by firm and country. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Panel A: CEO Contribution Alignment and Firm Import Decisions

Dep. Var.	Extensive Margin		Intensive Margin			
	Have Import		*Log(Volume)*		*Log(Shipments)*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Distance	-0.013		-0.100		-0.104	
	(0.026)		(0.122)		(0.065)	
Distance×Aligned CEO	-0.016	-0.009	-0.129***	-0.165***	-0.056**	-0.046
(Contribution)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.040)	(0.051)	(0.027)	(0.038)
Distance×CEO No Contribution	0.023	-0.015	-0.065	-0.053	-0.018	-0.015
	(0.044)	(0.059)	(0.176)	(0.181)	(0.103)	(0.102)
Firm×CEO×Country×Product	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country×Product×Time		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	70,877	55,367	47,844	34,996	49,606	36,197
Adjusted R^2	0.330	0.310	0.680	0.655	0.639	0.633

Panel B: Effects of CEO Voting History Alignment and Contribution Alignment

Dep. Var.	Extensive Margin		Intensive Margin			
	Have Import		*Log(Volume)*		*Log(Shipments)*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Distance	-0.012		-0.099		-0.103	
	(0.026)		(0.122)		(0.065)	
Distance×*Aligned CEO*	-0.017**	-0.025***	-0.028	-0.116*	-0.040	-0.080*
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.043)	(0.064)	(0.027)	(0.042)
Distance×*Aligned CEO*	-0.003	0.002	-0.108**	-0.114*	-0.024	-0.012
(Contribution)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.051)	(0.059)	(0.033)	(0.042)
Distance×*CEO No Contribution*	0.026	-0.012	-0.061	-0.052	-0.011	-0.015
	(0.045)	(0.060)	(0.175)	(0.179)	(0.104)	(0.101)
Firm×CEO×Country×Product	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country×Product×Time		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	70,877	55,367	47,844	34,996	49,606	36,197
Adjusted R^2	0.330	0.310	0.680	0.655	0.639	0.634

Table IA.5: **Board Partisanship and CEO Partisanship**
This table compares the effects of firm CEO partisanship and board members' partisanship in influencing firms' import decisions in response to geopolitical tensions. Sample and variable definitions are the same as in Table 3. *Board Alignment* is the percentage of board members that are affiliated with the same party as the current President. In computing this measure, we only account for Democrat and Republican board members. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by firm and country. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Panel A: Board Partisanship

Dep. Var.	*Log(1+Volume)*		*Log(1+Shipments)*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Distance	-0.164*		-0.122*	
	(0.098)		(0.062)	
Distance×*Board Alignment*	-0.061	-0.025	-0.077**	-0.038
	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.033)	(0.041)
Firm×Country×Product	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country×Product×Time		Yes		Yes
Observations	69,030	53,815	70,924	55,413
Adjusted R^2	0.633	0.661	0.603	0.624

Panel B: Board and CEO Partisanship

Dep. Var.	*Log(1+Volume)*		*Log(1+Shipments)*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Distance	-0.160*		-0.111*	
	(0.091)		(0.058)	
Distance×*Aligned CEO*	-0.089**	-0.112***	-0.061**	-0.081**
	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.031)	(0.035)
Distance×*Board Alignment*	0.014	0.022	-0.025	0.004
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.043)	(0.044)
Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm×CEO×Country×Product	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country×Product×Time		Yes		Yes
Observations	68,962	53,743	70,877	55,367
Adjusted R^2	0.648	0.675	0.619	0.641

IA.4. Additional Robustness

Table IA.6: **Alternative Measures of Geopolitical Tension**
This table reports the effects of geopolitical tensions on partisan firms' import decisions, using alternative measures of geopolitical tensions. The first alternative measure is the percentage of conflict events between a foreign country and the U.S., using bilateral political conflicts from the Global Data on Events, Location and Tone (GDELT) database. *%Conflict Event* represents, among all the bilateral events initiated by the government, the share of conflict events between each source country and the U.S. The second alternative measure is *Political Distance* introduced by Berry et al. (2010), which incorporates differences in countries' policy-making uncertainty, democratic character, size of the state, and whether two countries are both WTO members, or are in the same regional trade agreement. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by firm and country. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Measure of Geopolitical Tension	*%Conflict Event*		*Political Distance*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dep. Var.	*Log(1+Volume)*	*Log(1+Shipments)*	*Log(1+Volume)*	*Log(1+Shipments)*
Geopolitical Tension×Aligned CEO	-1.028***	-0.537**	-0.007***	-0.003
	(0.248)	(0.225)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm×Country×Product	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	53,638	55,262	53,264	54,824
Adjusted R^2	0.676	0.641	0.676	0.641

Table IA.7: **Controlling for Other Measures of Distances**
This table examines the effects of geopolitical tension on the import decisions of partisan firms, controlling for other measures of distances with the U.S. introduced by Berry et al. (2010): (1) *Economic Distance*, differences in economic development and macroeconomic characteristics between countries as proxied by income (GDP per capita), inflation rates, exports as percentage of GDP, and imports as percentage of GDP; (2) *Administrative Distance*, differences in bureaucratic patterns and formal/informal institutional arrangements between countries, including colonial ties (whether countries share a colonizer-colonized link), language (percentage of population speaking the same language), religion (percentage of population sharing the same religion), and legal systems (whether countries share the same legal system); (3) *Demographic Distance*, differences in population characteristics between countries, including life expectancy at birth, birth rates and age structure (population under 14 and over 65 as percentages); and (4) *Geographic Distance*, the physical distance between countries, calculated using the great circle method, which measures the shortest path between two points on a sphere (Earth) based on the coordinates of the geographic centers of the countries). We also include the interactions with *Aligned CEO*. Sample and variable definitions are the same as in Table 3. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by firm and country. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Dep. Var.	*Have Import*		*Log(Volume)*		*Log(Shipments)*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Distance	0.005		-0.097		-0.079	
	(0.024)		(0.111)		(0.063)	
Distance×*Aligned CEO*	-0.027***	-0.014	-0.088*	-0.134*	-0.078**	-0.089*
	(0.009)	(0.018)	(0.048)	(0.075)	(0.032)	(0.052)
Firm×CEO×Country×Product	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country×Product×Time		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	69,774	54,986	47,193	34,830	48,869	35,977
Adjusted R^2	0.331	0.309	0.680	0.655	0.640	0.634

Table IA.8: **Measuring Firm Partisanship with Campaign Contributions**
This table reports the effects of geopolitical tensions on partisan firms' import decisions, measuring firm partisanship based on its contribution to political campaigns. Variable definitions are the same as in Table 3. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by firm and country. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Panel A: Firm Campaign Contribution

Dep. Var.	*Log(1+Volume)*		*Log(1+Shipments)*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Distance	-0.304***		-0.268***	
	(0.092)		(0.072)	
Distance×Aligned Firm (Contribution)	-0.079***	-0.048	-0.066***	-0.071**
	(0.029)	(0.040)	(0.025)	(0.033)
Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm×Country×Product	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country×Product×Time		Yes		Yes
Observations	86,525	71,003	89,142	73,438
Adjusted R^2	0.595	0.613	0.579	0.597

Panel B: CEO Affiliation and Firm Campaign Contribution

Dep. Var.	*Log(1+Volume)*	*Log(1+Shipments)*
	(1)	(2)
Distance×Aligned CEO	-0.170**	-0.137**
	(0.080)	(0.066)
Distance×Aligned Firm (Contribution)	-0.072	-0.097*
	(0.061)	(0.050)
Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes
Firm×CEO×Country×Product	Yes	Yes
Country×Product×Time	Yes	Yes
Observations	21,125	22,166
Adjusted R^2	0.650	0.617

Table IA.9: **Using Alternative Outcome Variable**
This table examines the effects of geopolitical tension on the import decisions of partisan firms, using alternative measures of import quantity. Sample and variable definitions are the same as in Table 3. *Weight* (*Containers*) refers to the total shipment weight in kilograms (number of containers) of products imported by the firm from a source country in a semester. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by firm and country. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Panel A: Shipment Weight

	Log(1+Weight)		*Log(Weight)*	
Dep. Var.:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Distance	-0.280		-0.190*	
	(0.231)		(0.098)	
Distance×*Aligned CEO*	-0.286***	-0.295***	-0.069**	-0.126**
	(0.094)	(0.102)	(0.032)	(0.061)
Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm×CEO×Country×Product	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country×Product×Time		Yes		Yes
Observations	70,877	55,367	49,606	36,197
Adjusted R^2	0.487	0.510	0.766	0.741

Panel B: Number of Containers

	Log(1+Containers)		*Log(Containers)*	
Dep. Var.:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Distance	-0.132*		-0.110	
	(0.069)		(0.079)	
Distance×*Aligned CEO*	-0.089***	-0.086**	-0.066**	-0.090*
	(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.028)	(0.046)
Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm×CEO×Country×Product	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country×Product×Time		Yes		Yes
Observations	70,877	55,367	49,606	36,197
Adjusted R^2	0.635	0.663	0.675	0.675

Table IA.10: **Alternative Samples: Excluding Extreme Antagonist Countries and Neighboring Countries**

This table examines the effects of geopolitical tension on the import decisions of partisan firms. Sample and variable definitions are the same as in Table 3. Panel A excludes observations imported from Mexico and Canada and Panel B excludes observations imported from China and Russia. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by firm and country. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Panel A: Excluding Mexico and Canada

Dep. Var.	*Log(1+Volume)*		*Log(1+Shipments)*		Extensive Margin *Have Import*		Intensive Margin *Log(Volume)*		*Log(Shipments)*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Distance	-0.151*		-0.116**		-0.003		-0.122		-0.105*	
	(0.088)		(0.057)		(0.022)		(0.115)		(0.063)	
Distance×Aligned CEO	-0.077**	-0.100**	-0.066***	-0.075**	-0.016**	-0.023**	-0.068*	-0.146**	-0.047**	-0.076*
	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.025)	(0.033)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.036)	(0.061)	(0.022)	(0.040)
Firm×CEO×Country×Product	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country×Product×Time		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	68,318	53,453	69,914	54,782	69,914	54,782	47,426	34,880	48,920	35,859
Adjusted R^2	0.650	0.676	0.620	0.641	0.330	0.309	0.680	0.655	0.639	0.634

Panel B: Excluding China and Russia

Dep. Var.	*Log(1+Volume)*		*Log(1+Shipments)*		Extensive Margin *Have Import*		Intensive Margin *Log(Volume)*		*Log(Shipments)*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Distance	-0.097		-0.097		-0.016		0.001		-0.040	
	(0.121)		(0.086)		(0.034)		(0.136)		(0.083)	
Distance×Aligned CEO	-0.061	-0.105*	-0.067*	-0.100*	-0.021*	-0.041**	-0.055	-0.166**	-0.043*	-0.078
	(0.040)	(0.053)	(0.035)	(0.056)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.044)	(0.078)	(0.024)	(0.057)
Firm×CEO×Country×Product	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country×Product×Time		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	46,735	32,273	48,536	33,821	48,536	33,821	31,563	20,198	33,218	21,300
Adjusted R^2	0.602	0.627	0.554	0.568	0.322	0.293	0.657	0.606	0.578	0.546

Table IA.11: **Countries with Close and Far Ideological Distances**

This table examines the effects of geopolitical tension on the import decisions of partisan firms, separately for countries with close and far ideological distances with the U.S. Sample and variable definitions are the same as in Table 3. *Close* (*Far*) is an indicator that equals one if the ideological distance is below (above) the sample median, and zero otherwise. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by firm and country. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

					Extensive Margin		Intensive Margin			
Dep. Var.	*Log(1+Volume)*		*Log(1+Shipments)*		*Have Import*		*Log(Volume)*		*Log(Shipments)*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Close	-0.995**		-1.061***		-0.355***		-0.841		-0.772**	
	(0.486)		(0.307)		(0.112)		(0.588)		(0.341)	
Distance×Close	0.144		0.147		0.065**		0.140		0.068	
	(0.123)		(0.094)		(0.033)		(0.166)		(0.107)	
Distance×Far	-0.217*		-0.221***		-0.051*		-0.166		-0.192***	
	(0.119)		(0.074)		(0.028)		(0.131)		(0.069)	
Distance×Aligned CEO×Close	-0.093*	-0.152**	-0.069*	-0.084	-0.017*	-0.015	-0.078	-0.222**	-0.037	-0.088
	(0.051)	(0.074)	(0.039)	(0.058)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.057)	(0.100)	(0.039)	(0.068)
Distance×Aligned CEO×Far	-0.078**	-0.124***	-0.063**	-0.082**	-0.016**	-0.020**	-0.066	-0.179**	-0.041	-0.085*
	(0.037)	(0.043)	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.040)	(0.068)	(0.026)	(0.047)
Differential Effect (Close - Far)	-0.014	-0.028	-0.006	-0.002	-0.001	0.006	-0.011	-0.043	0.005	-0.002
	(0.023)	(0.044)	(0.017)	(0.034)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.025)	(0.049)	(0.016)	(0.031)
Firm×CEO×Country×Product	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country×Product×Time		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	68,962	53,743	70,877	55,367	70,877	55,367	47,844	34,996	49,606	36,197
Adjusted R^2	0.648	0.675	0.619	0.641	0.330	0.311	0.680	0.655	0.639	0.634

Table IA.12: **Results from an Annual Panel**

This table examines the effects of geopolitical tension on the import decisions of partisan firms using annual frequency data. The sample is a firm-source country-product-year panel, aggregated from our baseline sample used in Table 3. *Volume* (*Shipments*) refers to the total shipment volume in TEUs (number of shipments) of products imported by the firm from a source country in a semester. *Have Import* is an indicator that turns to one if a firm imports a certain product from a source country during a semester. *Distance* represents the ideological distance between a foreign country and the U.S. based on their UN voting patterns (Bailey et al., 2017). *Aligned CEO* is an indicator that equals one if a firm's CEO is affiliated with the same party as the U.S. President, and zero otherwise. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by firm and country. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

					Extensive Margin		Intensive Margin			
Dep. Var.	*Log(1+Volume)*		*Log(1+Shipments)*		*Have Import*		*Log(Volume)*		*Log(Shipments)*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Distance	-0.162		-0.121*		-0.002		-0.053		-0.092	
	(0.106)		(0.066)		(0.021)		(0.119)		(0.069)	
Distance×*Aligned CEO*	-0.085**	-0.118***	-0.073***	-0.089**	-0.009	-0.008	-0.082**	-0.173**	-0.067***	-0.113**
	(0.035)	(0.044)	(0.027)	(0.038)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.036)	(0.070)	(0.024)	(0.047)
Firm×CEO×Country×Product	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country×Product×Time		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	33,930	26,272	34,904	27,023	34,904	27,023	27,587	20,608	28,495	21,237
Adjusted R^2	0.658	0.671	0.606	0.612	0.256	0.206	0.669	0.628	0.616	0.594